




Viewpoints Special Edition

The Islamization of Pakistan, 1979-2009

*The Middle East Institute
Washington, DC*





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***Viewpoints* Special Edition**

The Islamization of Pakistan, 1979-2009

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The Islamization of Pakistan, 1979-2009

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Introduction

Since 2007, Pakistan, though not on the verge of becoming a failed state, nonetheless has been gripped by a series of interrelated crises. As the contributors to this volume demonstrate, Pakistan's current travails have deep and tangled historical roots. They also demonstrate that Pakistan's domestic situation historically has been influenced by, and has affected developments in neighboring countries as well as those farther afield.

The origins of many of Pakistan's troubles today lie not just in the circumstances in which the state of Pakistan emerged, but in the manner in which various domestic political forces have defined and sought to advance their competing visions of the state since independence. Over the years, successive national political leaders, the military, and other actors have appropriated the symbols, institutions, tools of statecraft, and even the rhetoric of Pakistan's founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, in order to advance their own narrow agendas.

As the contributors emphasize, much of the present turmoil in Pakistan dates from the late 1970s, when the rise to power of General Zia ul Haq and his Islamization program intersected with the momentous events of 1979, most importantly, the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The 18 essays comprising this volume examine the tight interplay between these domestic and regional factors, discuss the key domestic and foreign policies adopted during the Zia years, and disclose the heavy cost that Pakistan and its people have borne as a consequence. Taken together, the essays present a grim, tragic account of the past 30 years — of a country's founding creed violated, much of its resources misspent, and its social fabric rent. And they suggest an uncertain future. At the same time, however, they point hopefully, if not confidently, to what Pakistan's fragile civilian government must seek to reclaim and can achieve — provided that its leaders prove to be moderate, resourceful, and determined, and that the West (especially the United States) implements policies which support rather than undermine them.

In his Eid-ul-Azha Message to the Nation on October 24, 1947, Muhammad Ali Jinnah declared: "My message to you all is of hope, courage and confidence. Let us mobilize all our resources in a systematic and organized way and tackle the grave issues that confront us with grim determination and discipline worthy of a great nation." More than a half-century has elapsed since Jinnah made this statement, yet the issues facing Pakistan are no less grave. One hopes that the current and next generation of Jinnah's successors, together with Pakistan's friends will be able to summon the necessary will and bolster the state's capacity to deal with these issues effectively.

I. Origins and Consequences of Pakistan's Multiple Crises

Post-1979 Pakistan: What Went Wrong?

Touqir Hussain

No single year has reflected and effected more significant changes in the Islamic world than 1979. Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran were epicenters as well as tributaries, and confluences of the history-making events of that year.

The year began with the Iranian Revolution, which immediately changed the strategic landscape not only of the Persian Gulf but also of the entire Middle East. In April 1979 in Pakistan, an elected Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was executed by a military dictator, Zia ul-Haq, laying the foundation for an 11-year army rule that, on the one hand, unleashed the army's overweening political and strategic ambitions and, on the other, set in motion the process of the Islamization of the country. The two merged as part of a religiously denominated national security doctrine that turned Pakistan's regional policy into a *jihad*.

In November 1979, the holy sites in Mecca were occupied by an anti-monarchy group. False rumors that American forces had entered these sites to help Saudis end the siege led to the burning of the US Embassy in Islamabad and the start of a wave of anti-Americanism in Pakistan that already had been incited by US-Pakistan tensions over the nuclear issue and the Iranian Revolution. The same month saw the beginning of the American hostage crisis in Tehran, unfolding three decades of Iranian-US tensions and feeding anti-Americanism in the entire Islamic world. Pakistani and Iranian anti-Americanism came to reinforce each other, providing the nucleus of a broader sentiment against the US in the Islamic world. Pakistan embarked on a national vision that made it vulnerable to political Islam.

The year's most consequential event occurred in December, when Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan. The US-led *jihad* against the Soviets in Afghanistan, assisted by Pakistan under the military rule of Zia ul-Haq, laid the foundation of an extremist religious infrastructure that not only served US strategic interests but also helped other Islamic countries and fueled especially the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. The forces unleashed by these actions had a horrendously adverse impact on the region and on US and global security.

General Zia had begun to give new meaning to the concepts of war, conflict, and *jihad*. *Jihad* no longer remained defensive, but became an offensive war. Thus during Zia's time was born Pakistani-style jihadist Islam, spawning a whole generation of militants. The



Touqir Hussain is a former senior diplomat from Pakistan who has served as Ambassador to Brazil, Spain, and Japan. He also held senior positions in the Pakistani Foreign Office, including that of Additional Foreign Secretary, heading the bureaus of the Middle East and of the Americas and Europe. From 1996 to 1998, he was the Diplomatic Adviser to the Prime Minister. Additionally, he was a Senior Fellow at the US Institute of Peace in 2004-5, and subsequently has been a Research Fellow at the George Washington University and an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University and the University of Virginia.

army became its major stakeholder. Indeed, many personal ambitions also came to find focus on it. Understandable security concerns were inflated by the army's political ambitions and institutional pride, making rivalry and competition with India an end in and of itself. A powerful army began feeding on a weak and insecure state and, of course, on US aid.

[S]ecurity concerns were inflated by the army's political ambitions and institutional pride, making rivalry and competition with India an end in and of itself. A powerful army began feeding on a weak and insecure state and, of course, on US aid.

cy, the ISI. First Afghanistan and then Pakistan became the home of this radicalism, which began searching for new targets within and beyond the region.

The army, especially the ISI, enhanced its potential to find new targets during the *jihad* against the Soviets in the 1980s. Following their victory over the Soviets, the Americans had left behind a broken Afghanistan, a restive *jihad*, and an embittered Pakistan — abandoned and sanctioned for its nuclear program in October 1990.

Isolated and suffused with anti-Americanism, Pakistan was left to its own devices. The national purpose yielded to illusions, emotions, and a passion for dangerous causes. The army and the *jihad* found easy targets of opportunity and new causes — Kashmir and then the Taliban. In the process, both Afghanistan and Pakistan played havoc with each other, in the end becoming tributaries and confluences of extremist influences.

During the so-called “decade of democracy” in the 1990s, Pakistan's leading politicians played along by outbidding each other in their commitment to Islam and support for the army's ambitions. Islam, which always had been important to Pakistan's national identity, became populist. And populist and political Islam began beating to the rhythm of global Islamic revivalism, whose focus was on anti-Americanism.

This national vision, embraced by years of authoritarian rule and deformed democracy, led to a weak institutional architecture that collided with the crosscurrents of sectarian, ethno-linguistic, and other domestic tensions, opening up Pakistan to instability.

As institutions crumbled and became adjuncts to centers of power, the rule of law and social stability were degraded and preyed on by the forces of extremism. The state lacked the political will, moral authority, and effective instruments of law and order. The worst affected were the weak and vulnerable strata of society who, lacking physical and economic security, could do no more than despair and contemplate extreme and illusory avenues to empowerment, including radical Islamism.

Although the majority of people were moderate, and remain so, they were becoming vulnerable to radical thought and propaganda and losing a sense of national direction. Pakistan was becoming fractious and ungovernable.

It was this troubled Pakistan with which a deeply unpopular America re-engaged after 9/11 to fight a war that was unpopular to begin with and became more so as it came to sustain an authoritarian ruler. Pakistanis feel that Pervez Musharraf's partnership with Washington harmed the country, especially as the war on terrorism came to undermine Pakistan's stability through suicide attacks, challenged its sovereignty, and threatened its territorial integrity by fomenting religious-based nationalism in the smaller provinces.

Pakistan now faces an existential threat. Where do we go from here? Indeed, all stakeholders have a role to play in influencing Pakistan's future. But the vision for the future must be different. The Pakistani army needs to rethink its national role and relationship with the people. By over-reaching, the army has brought Pakistan to grief. In the end, if the army is consumed by its strategic over-extension and overweening political ambitions, it may be left as the sole guarantor of Pakistan's survival and will be as much the loser as the people of Pakistan. For the politicians, too, this is the last chance for redemption. The Islamists also must join the fight against the radicals because if the country collapses it will be their turn, and that is not an option, for them or for Pakistan.

The Pakistani people also need to change their attitudes, especially their outlook on religion. Suffused with anti-Americanism and religious fervor, Pakistanis are filtering their worldview through the prism of religion and the tensions between Islam and the West, making them vulnerable to the radical propaganda and paralyzing their will to act against forces of extremism.


The United States, too, needs a strategic change in its Pakistan policy. A way has to be found to harmonize US strategic interests, Pakistan's core national interests, and people's aspirations for empowerment and good governance. Pakistan will remain a crucial partner in fighting extremism and terrorism, but only a stable and reformed Pakistan can be a useful partner. Therefore, the biggest challenge for the United States is to craft policies in and towards Pakistan that help not just the latter's governing elite and American strategic interests but the people of Pakistan and a reformed vision of Pakistan. A reformed Pakistan headed toward moderation is likely to find America's interests to be consistent with its own.

Given the enormity of the self-inflicted damage to the country, mere survival has been a great achievement. Hopefully, the Swat operation represents the first stirrings of the changes that are necessary to ensure not just that the country survives but that it prospers.

Pakistan's Reverse Revolution

Imtiaz Gul

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution in 1979 marked the beginning of a painful journey for Pakistan that has culminated in a reverse socio-political revolution on two counts. First, instead of reaping rich dividends from a partnership with the United States that engineered the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, Pakistan today faces its gravest security challenge, as some of the forces with which it had partnered to defeat the Soviets and later used to force the Indians out of Kashmir are biting back. Second, post-revolutionary Iran's expanding cultural presence and influence engendered a Saudi Salafist counter-reaction, thereby turning Pakistan into a battleground for a Saudi-Iranian proxy war which sowed the seeds of sectarian acrimony and violence between the country's minority Shi'a and majority Sunni populations.



Imtiaz Gul, Chairman, Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), Islamabad.

Although the questionable “War against Terrorism” unleashed in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks by the US-led coalition introduced a different dynamic into Pakistan's political landscape, the genesis of the reaction to this war clearly lies in the Afghan *jihād* that the United States had led and funded to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan. That *jihād* gave birth to a new generation of anti-Western warriors — *jihādists* inspired by Usama bin Ladin and his deputy, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. Some of them denounce Pakistan as a US collaborator, which they then use to justify their “*jihād*” against organs of the Pakistani state, particularly the security apparatus comprising the army, police, and the intelligence services.

Ironically, following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan had a ready-made fighting force in the form of the *mujahidin* — Afghan as well as local. Pakistan also had a ready-made champion of this fighting force — the Pakistani military, which thought that the *mujahidin* could be useful for engineering Kashmir's separation from India, either through a militant struggle or a UN-led plebiscite. The ensuing nexus between Kashmiri Muslims who wanted independence from New Delhi and Pakistan's intelligence outfits proved to be disastrous. From mid-1988 onward, relations with India deteriorated. During the mid- and late 1990s, Pakistani military institutions actively supported Kashmiri separatist groups, using Afghanistan, which was ruled by the obscurantist Taliban regime, as a training ground. The Pakistani establishment considered this effort to be a masterful, cost-effective tactical maneuver. But the strategic consequences of this policy were disastrous.

Forced into international isolation and hamstrung by a mighty military establishment whose strength was rooted in the Afghan *jihad* of the 1980s, none of the four civilian governments in the 1990s could turn Pakistan's foreign policy around, particularly its India and Afghanistan policy. When in 1999 then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif attempted to open up to India, the army undercut the move in May of that year by moving into the Indian part of Kashmir and occupying the strategic heights of Kargil. This revived the acrimony between India and Pakistan, and sowed discord between Sharif and then-Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf.

Mired in the Kashmir-centric policy and given to the idea of "*jihad*" there, Musharraf, who came to power in a bloodless coup in 1999, became an international pariah. Following the 9/11 attacks, however, Musharraf's fortunes turned; he went on to become one of the most sought-after heads of state by virtue of Pakistan's emergence as the central front in the US-led effort to wage a successful war against terrorism in Afghanistan.

Thus, much of the recent and current turmoil in the country has roots in the seismic events of 1979 and policies taken in response to them. This turmoil is as tragic as it is worrisome. Since January 2008, Pakistan, 75% of whose 170 million inhabitants live on less than two dollars a day, has been rocked by 110 suicide bombings conducted by groups opposed to NATO's presence in Afghanistan. During this period, hundreds of explosions and ambushes have taken close to 2,000 lives. In fact, in April 2009 things had turned so ugly that the international community began talking and thinking aloud of "Pakistan's disintegration in the face of mounting Islamist insurgency — the mortal threat." Since early May 2009, the military operations in Pakistan's border regions against some of the remnants of the Afghan *Jihad* have resulted in the displacement of nearly 2.5 million people.

Since early May 2009, the military operations in Pakistan's border regions against some of the remnants of the Afghan *Jihad* have resulted in the displacement of nearly 2.5 million people.

Besides the army, the United States has been the other common element that has influenced Pakistan's political development in the last three decades. In Iran, Americans retreated, while in Afghanistan, Americans mounted a methodical proxy war. In both of these American foreign policy experiments, Pakistan served as the laboratory. While the Americans left Pakistan to its own devices after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in February 1989, the Bush Administration lapped up Pakistan soon after 9/11 — but this time with a few words of regret and expression of determination never again to leave the country in a lurch. In May 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also apologized for what the Americans had done to Pakistan in the late 1990s. Pakistanis have been bearing the brunt of "incoherent US policies for the past 30 years," Clinton admitted. Although Pakistan's numerous problems prompted former US Secretary of State Madeline Albright to refer to Pakistan as the "global migraine" in December 2008, President Barack Obama promises to cure the country of all its ills. So do other international figures, such as British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy. Unlike in the past when these nations extended unquestioned support to military dictators, this time they seem to be following a two-track policy: supporting the military in counter-insurgency on the one hand, and standing behind the civilian government on the other.

But the damage inflicted upon Pakistan will be difficult to repair. The tumultuous year of 1979 began a long, painful, and destructive period for the country. The US practice of expediency combined with the self-serving policies of Pakistan's military dictators increased the state's reliance on extremist non-state actors who are now eating into the very vitals of the state of Pakistan. Unless neutralized — a task that will be neither quick nor easy to accomplish — these groups will continue to threaten the peace and stability not only of Pakistan but of the entire region.

Pakistan: Reclaiming the Founding Moment

Suroosh Irfani

Rooted in a democratic struggle that ended British rule in the subcontinent, there was something remarkable about Pakistan's emergence on August 14, 1947 as a sovereign Muslim state. This was as much reflected in the founding father Muhammad Ali Jinnah's address to Pakistan's first Constituent Assembly as in its national anthem and flag celebrating Pakistan's founding moment. Jinnah's speech set the direction for Pakistan as a modern democratic state, where religion was a personal matter that had "nothing to do with the business of the state," and people could creatively rework a divisive past for a promising future.¹ At the same time, the inclusive spirit of a South Asian Muslim identity was reflected, on the one hand, in the national anthem composed by Jagan Nath Azad, a scholar of Indo-Persian culture, and on the other hand, in a flag that celebrated Pakistan's 3% religious minority population by giving them 25% of the flag's space — its white section. Such eclecticism, rooted in Indo-Persian culture, also prevailed in the new national anthem adopted seven years later: the anthem is as much in Urdu as Persian, the composition is by a Zoroastrian, and the chorus giving it an "Indian" aura comprises almost equal numbers of female and male singers (respectively five and six).²

Indeed, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's populist slogan of "Islam, Democracy, and Socialism" that gave him a landslide win in Pakistan's first general elections held in 1970 also reflected the eclectic spirit of Pakistan's South Asian Muslim identity. However, General Zia ul-Haq, who toppled Bhutto's government in a military coup in 1977 and had him hanged two years later, set Pakistan on a different track that eroded the South Asian spirit of its identity. Lacking a political or social base of his own other than the army, Zia carved out a constituency for himself through a Saudi-backed polity of "Islamization." This policy infused Islamic conservatism in the state and society and co-opted religio-political parties, especially the Jamaat-e Islami — Pakistan's best organized religious party that historically stood in opposition to Jinnah and Pakistan. Moreover, Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in support of Kabul's Marxist regime in 1979 helped to entrench General Zia's regime and turn Pakistan into "America's most allied ally" as a Cold War frontline state.



Suroosh Irfani is a writer and columnist based in Lahore. He was senior Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, and co-director of the Graduate Program in Communication and Cultural Studies at National College of Arts, Lahore. His current interests include the transformation of popular Muslim imagination, and the dialogical self in Sufism and Jungian Psychology.

1. Muhammad Ali Jinnah's address to Pakistan's first Constituent Assembly, August 11, 1947.

2. Composed by Ghulam Ahmed Chagla, the new anthem was first played at Karachi airport on March 30, 1950, when the Shah of Iran visited Pakistan. It took another four years for an official Committee to select Hafeez Jallanduri's poem for the anthem's lyrics, from over 700 entries.

Indeed, if the Cold war had given General Zia a shortcut to legitimacy on the international front, the Afghan *jihad* enabled Zia to stake Pakistan's future on the *jihadi* politics in Afghanistan, giving rise to a plethora of homegrown militant groups. Clearly, the US-Saudi backed Afghan *Jihad*, occurring in a regional context shaken by Shi'a revivalist Ayatollahs of the Iranian Revolution, had fateful consequences for Pakistan. At the same time, with the virtual collapse of state education, religious schools linked with *jihadi* groups rapidly expanded as breeders of a violent *jihadi* culture that eclipsed Pakistan's South Asian identity while promoting an "Arabist shift." This tendency to view the Arab as the only "real"/pure Muslim uses this trope of purity as a self-righteous weapon for recasting the present in a glorified imaginary of a triumphal Arab past.³ Such reasoning is reflected in a detained Pakistani suicide bomber's recent interview on Geo Television, the largest satellite channel in the country. The would-be bomber justified the killing of innocent children and citizens in the ongoing spate of suicide bombings by invoking the *fatwa* of "a great Arab cleric," to the effect that those who died in the bombings were not innocent victims as they did not support Taliban's *jihad*.⁴

Indeed, in the 1990s, when Pakistan helped the Taliban rise to power in Afghanistan, Talibanic Islam became virtually synonymous with Usama bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida through fusion with Wahhabi-Salafi radicalism, even as Peshawar became "the capital of the Islamic world."⁵ According to al-Qa'ida strategist Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, "Every ongoing discussion and debate [in Peshawar] quickly spread out to the rest of the world, through audio *communiqués*, books, leaflets, audiocassettes, and through couriers and visitors."⁶ Moreover, if the founding moment of Indo-Persian culture was rooted in the 11th century publication of *Kashf ul Mahjub*, [*The Unveiling of the Hidden*], a treatise on Sufism by Lahore's patron saint, Ali Uthman Hujwiri (d. 1077),⁷ the publication in Peshawar of al Suri's *The Experience and Lessons of the Islamic Jihadi Revolution*⁸ in 1991 might well have signaled the internalization of an Arabist shift in Pakistan.

[R]eligious schools linked with *jihadi* groups rapidly expanded as breeders of a violent *jihadi* culture that eclipsed Pakistan's South Asian identity while promoting an "Arabist shift" — a tendency to view the Arab as the only "real"/pure Muslim ...

At the same time, Arab and Pakistani *jihadis* continued to flourish in the training camps of Afghanistan and Pakistani administered Kashmir after Zia's death and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, even as Pakistan briefly realized its dream of gaining "strategic depth" in Afghanistan under Taliban rule from 1996-2001. However, all this changed following the September 11, 2001 suicide attacks on the United States. And

3. Suroosh Irfani, "Pakistan's sectarian violence: Between the 'Arabist Shift' and Indo-Persian Culture., in Satu Limaye *et al.*, ed., *Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia* (Honolulu: Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004), p. 148.

4. Geo current affairs program *Jirga*, July 2, 2009.

5. Brynjar Lia, *Architect of Global Jihad: the Life of Al Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus'ab al-Suri* (London: Hurst, 2007), p. 87.

6. Lia, *Architect of Global Jihad*.

7. Translated by R.A. Nicholson into English in 1911, Hujwiri's was the first encyclopedic work on Sufism in Persian. As Persian became the administrative language of successive Muslim rulers in northern India, it also became the medium for a new cultural force symbolized by Sufism, reflecting a spiritual humanism that triggered a cultural efflorescence in Indian art, architecture, literature, and music.

8. Lia, *Architect of Global Jihad*, p. 486. Al-Suri later went on to write *The Global Islamic Resistance Call* (2004), the "Bible" of violent global *jihad*, available online in Arabic.

although the invasion by US forces in October 2001 led to the rout of Taliban and al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan, this further radicalized Pakistan's Islamist groups, even as Taliban and al-Qa'ida members sought refuge in Pakistan. Indeed, most Pakistanis regarded the Taliban as "true Muslims" and bin Ladin as a "hero of Islam," thereby enabling the terrorists to exploit local hospitality in Pakistan. It is therefore not surprising that Pakistani security forces arrested Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, al-Qa'ida's 9/11 mastermind, from the house of a Jamaat-e Islami member, while Taliban leader Abdullah Mehsud blew himself up in the house of a leader of Jamiat-e Ulama-e Islam (Fazlur Rehman group). Indeed, when former President Pervez Musharraf's government stepped up its campaign to hunt bin Ladin and other "religious terrorists," the rage of religio-political parties was summed up by former leader of Jamaat-e Islami, Qazi Hussein Ahmed, who denounced the campaign "a Zionist conspiracy."⁹

Clearly, the infusion of violent *jihadi* culture in Pakistan — spawned by the Afghan *Jihad* and state sponsored militant groups for *jihad* in Indian held Kashmir — poses a "mortal threat" to Pakistan. The ongoing Taliban insurgency in Pakistan's northwestern areas is a graphic example of this threat. The existential threat that Pakistan faces is not only because of Taliban *per se*, but also a complicit culture largely blurring the boundaries between "extremist" and "mainstream" in the Islamist spectrum.

According to a new public opinion survey held in Pakistan in May, 2009, over 81% regard al-Qa'ida and Pakistani Taliban "a critical threat to Pakistan" — a huge increase from 34% in late 2007.

However, a sea change has occurred in Pakistan's public perceptions of al Qa'ida and the Taliban since the Pakistani Army moved into Pakistan's northwestern areas in May, 2009 to crush the Taliban insurgency. The airing of video clips of Taliban brutalities on Pakistan's TV channels were as critical as the Taliban's boasting of suicide bombings of Pakistan's civilian and security spaces in turning the tide of public opinion against the Taliban. According to a new public opinion survey held in Pakistan in May 2009, over 81% regard al-Qa'ida and Pakistani Taliban "a critical threat to Pakistan" — a huge increase from 34% in late 2007. As for the Afghan Taliban, "87 percent think that groups fighting to overthrow the Afghan government should not be allowed to have base in Pakistan."¹⁰

Even so, military action against the Taliban would remain inconclusive without socio-economic and educational measures for winning "hearts and minds," especially of the people displaced by recent fighting. At the same time, such measures should aim to promote a new political culture in sync with Pakistan's founding moment, summed up by Jinnah's speech to the Constituent Assembly. Indeed, reclamation of Pakistan's South Asian Muslim identity, so poignantly reflected in Jinnah's speech, is as crucial to the survival of a democratic Pakistan as the battle to defeat the Taliban.

9. *The Nation*, July 2, 2002.

10. World Public Opinion Poll (WorldPublicOpinion.org), reported in *Dawn*, July 2, 2009.

II. Debating Pakistan's Muslim Identity

Reclaiming Pakistan's Pacifist Religious Creed

Ishtiaq Ahmad

If there is a cut-off point in the 62-year life of Pakistan, a country created in the name of Islam by secular Muslim leadership, it is 1979. For whatever traditionally pacifist sub-continental Islamic creed with a strong Persian influence that the country had retained since the partition of 1947 effectively ended that year. Since then, until the rise of al-Qa'ida/Wahhabi-inspired Taliban extremism and terrorism in recent years, Pakistan has seen the consistent erosion of the broadly inclusive religious tradition it had inherited from the pre-independence Subcontinent — a heritage, in particular, of the centuries of Muslim rule under the Delhi Sultanate and Mughal Empire.

The two epoch-making regional developments of 1979 — the revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan — were instrumental in conservative military leader General Zia ul-Haq's efforts to consolidate political power and institutionalize religious radicalism in the country. Pakistan's association with the Afghan *Jihad* during his rule and with the Kashmir *jihad* in its aftermath strengthened radical religious tendencies in state and society. The extremist ideologies and terrorist practices of al-Qa'ida and its local affiliates, especially since the start of the Afghan war in 2001, also have reinvigorated religious radicalism in the country.

The Musharraf regime was no doubt an antidote to Zia's rule, but its inherently authoritarian nature was perhaps the main hurdle in reversing Zia's radical religious legacy. Pakistan's current civilian democratic government does not face such a limitation, and, therefore, has a unique opportunity to do what its civilian and military predecessors could not in the past couple of decades: re-institutionalize the founding ideals of the nation, which were grounded in one of the finest statements on secularism ever made. Pakistan's founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, said in his August 11, 1947 presidential address before the Constituent Assembly:

You are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place or worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the State ... We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State ... Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.

Pakistan's greatest tragedy is that the last three decades negate every visionary word Jinnah uttered about the future destiny of the country on the eve of its creation. What



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could be more ironic than the fact that the same Islamists who had opposed the very idea of Pakistan, including Jamaat-e Islami, have hijacked its destiny during this period, which has seen bloody Sunni-Shi'ite sectarianism starting in late 80s and culminating into Taliban-led suicide terrorism at present.

The question of *Shari'a* in Swat, Taliban sanctuaries in Waziristan, the spread of Talibanization to regions far from the country's frontier with Afghanistan, and much more: Was it for all this that Jinnah had founded a separate homeland

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for the Muslims of the Subcontinent? His idea of Pakistan was simply that of a constitutionally secular, politically progressive, and religiously tolerant nation — one that would emulate all the attributes which had helped the Delhi Sultans and Mughals establish a benevolent Muslim reign in Hindu-majority India for several centuries before the arrival of the British.

Had Jinnah not died so early, the face of Pakistan might have been different today. For like Mustafa Kemal Ataturk of Turkey and Jawaharlal Nehru in India, he would have had enough time to consolidate the basic constitution-

al and structural foundations of a secular state, thereby clearing away all of the societal confusion about the country's real national destiny. Consequently, even in the wake of the radical regional developments of 1979, the country might not have experienced the consistently regressive trend leading up to the current religiously rooted terrorist quagmire.

It is true that the national context for the sudden upsurge of religious radicalism in the 1980s was already there. Within a year of Jinnah's death, the Constituent Assembly adopted the Objectives Resolution, which stated:

Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone, and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust ... Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed ...Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accord with the teaching and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Qur'an and the Sunna.

This Resolution forms a preamble to every Constitution Pakistan has had, and is a direct rebuke to Jinnah's secular vision for the country as expressed in his historic speech before the Constituent Assembly. It empowered the Islamists, reinforcing their claim to be the custodians of Pakistan as an Islamic state, and providing a legitimate excuse for today's neo-Taliban organizations such as Tehrik-e Nifaz-e Shariat-e Muhammadi operating in Swat today to demand *Shari'a*.

Despite this, it can be safely argued that religious radicalism remained a peripheral force in the country until the end of the 1970s. Except the anti-Ahmadi riots of the 1950s, Pakistan never experienced any major instance of violence in the name of religion until the 1970s, which in itself is a popular reference point for all those who have seen exclusivist dogmatic Islam overtake the country's traditionally pacifist Islamic creed in the last 30 years. Those who have lived in

the 1970s often recall the nightlife of Karachi, and liquor shops doing business in broad daylight across the country during those golden years. The era of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto is still hailed as the last of the liberal times that the people enjoyed.

However, factors such as the 1971 dismemberment of East Pakistan on the basis of ethnicity, Mr. Bhutto's weakening power base, and deterioration in US-Pakistan ties pushed the Bhutto regime to play the Islamic card to prevent ethnic disunity, appease the religious right, and bring the country closer to Saudi Arabia. All of this may have had the unintended consequence of empowering radical Islamic forces and transforming the country's traditionally pacifist religious creed with strong Persian/Subcontinental influences into a new, potentially violent, Arabist-Wahhabist Islamist culture that has gripped the entire nation since 1979.

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Reclaiming Pakistan's pacifist religious creed may take as much time, if not more, than the three decades during which it eroded. However, an essential first step in this regard may be to initiate immediately a national debate on rethinking the country's founding ideals in accordance with the secular vision of Muhammad Ali Jinnah — the need for which is all the more clear and urgent when the very Islamic basis of the state has become its principal weakness and a major source of religious extremism and terrorism.

Moving beyond “Islamic”

Aasim Sajjad Akhtar

Throughout the Cold War period, and even more so after it, American scholars have attempted to understand Muslim societies. Every decade has brought with it new paradigms, although the broad tendency has been towards a limiting, and thus problematic, cultural essentialism. Since the beginning of the “War on Terror,” this tendency unfortunately has been reinforced, thanks in large part to the Bush Administration’s words and actions; the atrocious term “Islamofascism” comes to mind.



Yet, the need for Americans (and others for that matter) to become more knowledgeable about Muslim societies remains acute. Ethnocentric premises need to be discarded and more meaningful categories of analysis unearthed. The challenge lies, in the first instance, in recognizing that societies in which the majority of people are Muslim might not share as much with one another as is typically assumed. While Islam is undoubtedly a major factor in shaping the politics and culture of Muslim societies, it is essential to dedicate time and effort to understanding the other fault lines that pervade these societies.

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Unlike any other Muslim country, the modern state of Pakistan always has sought to overwrite other fault lines under the guise that Pakistanis (or at the very least the vast majority of them) all share the same religious identity. In contrast, Iranians do not shun their pre-Islamic past, and Arabs too recognize that they were Arabs before they were Muslims. The same can be said for Turks and Malays. But Pakistan is defined as the state for the Subcontinent’s Muslims, and thus Pakistanis do not know of any identity that supersedes their religious one — at least that is what the official discourse of the state always has posited.

In fact, Pakistan is fractured significantly along many lines that reflect pre-Pakistani identifications. Arguably the most obvious distinction in Pakistan is ethno-linguistic. The Pakistani state’s relationship with Pashtuns, Baluchs, Sindhis, and Bengalis has been strained since the very inception of the state. Most notably, Bengalis — or then, East Pakistanis — seceded in 1971 after relations deteriorated to the point of no return.

During Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s tenure, all sorts of symbolic attempts were made to rescue the ideology of Pakistan, or in other words, the notion that all those who reside within Pakistan are Muslims and not anything else. Given that over half of Pakistan’s population had given up on this notion and seceded, it might be argued that Bhutto’s attempts

were doomed from the beginning. As it turned out, General Zia ul-Haq overthrew Bhutto in a coup in 1977 on the back of a political movement calling for “Islamization” and proceeded to consolidate the ethnic imbalance in the state.

Zia ul-Haq of course employed the idiom of “*jihad*” to achieve strategic foreign policy objectives and to neuter domestic opposition. However, this epic attempt to use Islam to forge unity did not work. More than 30 years later, the trend towards fragmentation has intensified. Severe disaffection grips Baluchistan and the Pashtun-majority Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). Indeed, it is in the latter that the much-touted policy of patronizing *jihad* has backfired spectacularly. Has this “blowback” represented the final nail in the coffin for Pakistan’s state ideology?

Pakistan’s constitution-writing process in the late 1940s and early 1950s was painfully slow because of the machinations of the civil bureaucracy and military and also because of the lack of consensus over the role that Islam should play in the polity. Ultimately, the so-called “Objectives Resolution” was written into the preamble of the Constitution, clearly stating that Islam would underwrite the law of the land. This was nothing less than a mandate — albeit a vaguely understood one — for the state to instrumentalize Islam.

The 1973 constitution confirmed this: Article 227 reiterated that all legislation would conform to Islamic injunctions. Zia ul-Haq ruled by invoking this mandate repeatedly; indeed, he made “Islamisation” the *raison d’être* of his regime. No government that has followed the Zia regime (or preceded it for that matter) has dared to reopen the question of Islam’s role in the polity.

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The Taliban’s project for a creation of a *Shari’a* state in the NWFP is not, therefore, a simple matter of the state’s writ being challenged by insurgents. There is much more at stake here. This is why the state appeared to “surrender” to the insurgents when it came to the question of instituting “Islamic” law in the Malakand division of the NWFP. In fact, the state was not surrendering at all — it was simply acceding to the demand of the “people” to make good on the commitment made in the Constitution to make Islam the basis of all law.

Munawar Hasan, the head of the Jamaat-e Islami, the most prominent religious party in Pakistan, clearly noted that his organization and the insurgents share the same aspiration and differ only in terms of their methods. In the aftermath of the failed agreement between the insurgents and the government in Malakand, state functionaries have been insistent that they made all possible attempts to implement the agreement but that ultimately it was the insurgents who were not “sincere” in making *Shari’a* the law of the land.

This is, needless to say, a tenuous claim. Pakistan was one of three states (the others being Saudi Arabia and UAE) to recognize the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which came to power in the name of implementing *Shari'a* through the use of force. The state is using force against the Taliban insurgents very reluctantly. The latter have long been considered “strategic assets” and also represent the logical culmination of the state ideology.

The state remains committed to an obsolete official nationalism in the face of enormous contradictions, even while the pull of dissident nationalisms based primarily on ethno-linguistic identity becomes more pronounced. The overwhelming majority of Pakistanis might be Muslim, but this Muslim identity is not necessarily the primary operative identity in the political realm. The state may have tried to downplay ethnic and other identities, but has not succeeded in putting together a viable nation-building project. Understanding Pakistan and its society requires deeper interrogation of the multiple identities of ordinary people and the contradictions of official nationalism.

The Islamization of Pakistan's Educational System: 1979-1989

Nasim Ashraf

The decade of 1979-1989 can be viewed as the turning point for Pakistan's educational system. It was the bedrock on which militant extremism was founded, and has left indelible imprints on the Pakistani nation.

Religion was the justification given by General Zia ul-Haq to legitimize his dictatorship, as well as to consolidate his rule, which spanned more than 11 years. Coupled with geopolitical and sectarian struggles, Zia's Islamization reforms completely transformed the educational system of Pakistan. Religious schools, or *madrasas*, not only mushroomed, but also received official government patronage and international funding. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the United States prodded Afghanistan and Pakistan to support a "holy war" or *jihad* against the Soviets. Arab states were asked to fund this *jihad* against the Communists, and also to contain the new Islamic Revolution in Iran led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.



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Thanks to the failed educational policies of the previous regimes, Pakistan's educational system in the late 1970s was in total collapse. Zia's Islamization reforms, as well as the indoctrination of state institutions, instigated Islamic organizations that filled the gap by opening up *madrasas* in large numbers. In the first few years of General Zia ul-Haq's rule (1979-1982), only 151 new *madrasas* were opened, but over the next five years nearly 1,000 of them were established.¹ This was part of the strategy to mobilize *mujahidin* in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

General Zia relied heavily on the religious constituency for the political legitimacy of his regime. He wooed the clergy in Pakistan by offering them financial incentives and official recognition. A special committee² set up for this purpose suggested improvement in the economic conditions of *madrasas* through "unconditional and direct government financial assistance." *Zakat* funds were suggested to be used as the source of government support³. As a policy to increase the employment prospects of *madrasa* graduates, the Government instructed the University Grants Commission, the body responsible for accreditation of educational institutions, to issue equivalency certificates

1. *Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military*, ICG Asia Report No. 36, July 29, 2002.

2. The Halepota Committee, named after its chairman, Dr. A.W.J. Halepota, an educator who also had been associated with Ayub Khan's commission for *madrasa* reform in the 1960s. Jamal Malik, *Colonialisation of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional* (Lahore: Institutions in Pakistan, 1996), pp. 133-134.

3. Malik, *Colonialisation of Islam*.

to graduates of religious schools with the highest certificate from a *Wafaq* (Religious Accreditation Body) recognized as Masters in Islamic Studies.⁴ This greatly boosted the importance of *madrasas* and encouraged their growth.

The New Education Policy of 1979 changed the educational landscape in Pakistan. Five thousand mosque schools were approved and the curriculum of the public schools was rewritten with an emphasis on *jihad* and Islamization. The message of *jihad* initially targeted Communism. International patrons supplied funds, arms, and religious literature that were used freely in Pakistani *madrasas*.⁵ The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) paid the University of Nebraska, Omaha \$5.1 million between 1984-1994 to develop and design textbooks to promote *jihad*.⁶ Overall, about \$13 million worth of such textbooks were distributed in Pakistan in the Afghan refugees camps,⁷ schools, and Pakistani *madrasas* where students learned basic arithmetic by counting dead Russian soldiers and AK-47 rifles.

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Foreign funding and patronage from the Gulf countries also fueled sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shi'ites in Pakistan.⁸ *Madrasas* became the recruiting grounds for the militant wings of various sectarian religious groups. In fact, Pakistan became a battleground for Arab-Iranian rivalry, with a tremendous rise in the number of Shi'a *madrasas* and militant groups in response to the rapidly increasing strength and numbers of Deobandi followers, in particular the Ahl-e Hadith sect, which is the closest to the official Saudi creed. Indeed, the roots of the destabilizing sectarian conflict in Pakistan can be traced back to the decade of 1979-1989.

Pakistan's educational system can be subdivided into four tiers of education providers. Private elite schools usually cater to the rich, while up to 90% of the population attends public government schools. Non-elite private schools primarily attract the upper middle class population, and offer a comparatively better quality education to those who can afford it. *Madrasas*, the fourth tier of the country's educational system, usually are attended by less than 1% of school-age children.⁹ From 1979-1989 and continuing until today, public education has progressively deteriorated. Not only was the state unable to provide access to education — the basic constitutional right of every citizen — but the quality of education also declined significantly.¹⁰ The big gap in the public education system was gradually filled by the other three providers, i.e. private schools, both elite and non-elite, and the *madrasas*. Although the enrollment in *madrasas* always has been grossly overestimated, the real worry arises from the fact that 10-15% of the

4. Malik, *Colonialisation of Islam*.

5. Zia Rukhsana, "Religion and Education In Pakistan: An Overview," *Prospects Journal*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2003), pp. 165-178.

6. *Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military*.

7. Joe Stephens and David B. Ottaway, "From U.S., the ABC's of Jihad," *Washington Post*, March 23, 2002.

8. *Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military*.

9. Tahir Andrabi *et al*, "Religious School Enrollment in Pakistan: A Look at the Data," *Comparative Education Review*, Vol. 50, No. 3 (2006).

10. *Pakistan: reforming the education sector*, International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 84, October 7, 2004.

schools are affiliated with extremist religious and political groups.¹¹ It is this small but extremely potent minority that provides a pool of graduates for transnational terrorist networks. Extremist groups have been able to draw upon these students for furthering conflict in Kashmir, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and elsewhere.

CONCLUSION

After suffering from neglect and chronic under-resourcing due to an absence of political will in Pakistan's governments since its independence in 1947, the country's education system was damaged and transformed by Islamic indoctrination from 1979-1989. The current state of affairs in Pakistan reveals that policies which promoted the inclusion of extremist literature in *madrassa* syllabi are exacting a heavy price. In contrast to the years of 1979-1989, today's extremist message condones offensive, violent action against state infrastructure and ordinary Pakistanis, in addition to the Western world.

The future of Pakistan is a key concern for the world and there is an emphasis on the provision of health, education, and economic opportunity to its people. A concerted effort is required not just to reform a reluctant *madrassa* establishment, but also to channel domestic spending and international aid towards quality education — one that is affordable, offers employment prospects, and fosters open-mindedness.

11. P.W. Singer, *Pakistan's Madrassahs: Ensuring a System of Education not Jihad*, Brookings Papers, No. 41 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2001).

Jamaat-e Islami

Farhat Haq

Nineteen seventy-nine was a momentous year for the Jamaat-e Islami in Pakistan. Maulana Maududi, whose writings provided both the financial and intellectual foundation for the party, died after a long bout with kidney disease in Buffalo, New York. The same year, the arch-nemesis of the Jamaat, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, became a victim of what most Pakistanis considered a judicial murder at the hands of its erstwhile ally, General Zia ul-Haq. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution proved to be equally important in shaping Jamaat's role in Pakistani politics and its participation in Sunni Islamist politics. After 1979 the Jamaat became less of what it always had viewed itself to be — the vanguard of Islamic Revolution — and more what its opponents had often accused it of being, an opportunistic player willing to make compromises with authoritarian leaders to gain political advantages.

While there had been broad agreement within the Jamaat-e Islami since its inception in 1941 on the goal of creating an Islamic state, there had been a robust debate over the means. For the first several years of its existence, the Jamaat had argued that it would focus on the creation of *salih* (virtuous) Muslims by focusing on changing the hearts and minds of ordinary people through its literature (written mostly by Maududi) and by the exemplary character and behavior of its members. Though the Jamaat had opposed the creation of Pakistan, it quickly became the major proponent of the creation of an Islamic state in Pakistan and led the movement towards incorporating Islamic clauses into all three Pakistani constitutions (1956, 1964, and 1973). A minority of Jamaat's members felt that engaging in electoral politics and working within the system would take it away from its goal of an Islamic revolution resulting in an Islamic state. Maududi convinced the majority that now that Pakistan was a reality, working within the political system was the best option. During the first few years of its existence, Jamaat was skeptical of Western-style democracy, but the first coup by Ayub Khan and his attempts to limit the influence of religion in public life made Jamaat a strong proponent of establishing a parliamentary democracy and protecting the civil and political rights of citizens. This anti-establishment posture continued and even deepened during Bhutto's rule.

Although the Jamaat had railed against communism and socialism in its printed literature for many decades, Bhutto's government intensified Jamaat's venom against socialism. Bhutto had insisted that he was not interested in "God-less" socialism, but rather that he sought to bring about Islamic socialism. To this, Maududi retorted: "They found out that their Socialism cannot dance naked, after realizing this they started calling



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socialism 'Islamic.' But if it is really based on the Quran and the Sunnah then what is the need for calling it Socialism? Now when they can see that this too does not work they have started calling it Islamic equality (musawat). But their object is the same — pure socialism.”¹

Under Zia ul-Haq's rule, there was a fundamental shift in Jamaat's posture towards the state. The Jamaat proved to be an important “civilian” support base for Zia's military rule. For example, the Jamiat-e Tulaba (the student federation affiliated with the Jamaat), the largest and most disciplined student organization in the country, and the NLF (National Labor Federation) had kept the students and the labor unions from presenting any strong challenges to Zia's regime.² Moreover, the Jamaat had urged its teachers, doctors, lawyers, farmers, and ‘ulama’ organizations to mobilize support for Zia's Islamization program.

Though the Jamaat had opposed the creation of Pakistan, it quickly became the major proponent of the creation of an Islamic state in Pakistan and led the movement towards incorporating Islamic clauses into all three Pakistani constitutions.

In return for its support of the regime, the Jamaat was able to participate directly in government between August 1978 and June 1979, albeit as a part of an alliance with the PNA (a nine-party alliance against Bhutto). Moreover Zia's Islamization policies led to the creation of bodies such as the Majlis-e Shura (a body of advisors chosen by Zia), the Islamic Ideological Council, the Islamic University, local Sala' (prayer) and Zakat (Islamic tax) committees, and the Shari'a Courts — all of which were filled either by Jamaat members or its sympathizers.

Zia ul-Haq's Islamization policy renewed the debate within the Jamaat's ranks about the best tactics to achieve an Islamic state in Pakistan. Was the imposition of *Shari'a* the most important objective — and therefore did it not matter that it was imposed by a military general or by a monarch, as in Saudi Arabia? Some of the younger members of the Jamaat who were inspired by the Iranian Revolution argued that monarchy or dictatorship was incapable of introducing a truly Islamic system; therefore, the Jamaat should distance itself from Zia's government and Saudi patronage. Jamaat's ties to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini went back to 1963, when Maududi met him during the *Haj* season in Mecca. In the same year, the Jamaat published an article in the October issue of *Tarjuman al-Quran* which was highly critical of the Shah's policy toward the ‘ulama’ in Iran. The Iranian Embassy lodged a protest against the article to the Pakistani government. During the Iranian Revolution, the Jamaat gave its full support to Ayatollah Khomeini. Then, in January 1979, Khomeini sent two of his representatives to Maududi to thank him for the Jamaat's support. In February 1979, Mian Tufial Muhammad, the Jamaat's “Amir,” led a delegation to Iran.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan ensured that the Jamaat would lean more toward the Saudi model of the imposition of Islam from above and less towards the Iranian model of an Islamic revolution. Until 1994, when the Taliban became

1. See *Criterion*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (1970), pp. 62-63.

2. See Stephen Cohen and Marvin Weinbaum, “Pakistan in 1982: Holding On,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1983), p.123.

the favored client of the Pakistani state, the Jamaat's ally, Gulbuddin Hekmetyar, was the greatest beneficiary of the Intelligence Services Directorate's (ISI) channeling of money and weapons. The Jamaat had maintained a close working relationship with Hekmetyar since the early 1970s, and after the invasion its relationship with Hekmetyar's Hezb-e Islami (Islamic Party) became even closer. In the 1980s things seemed to be going Jamaat's way. The Jamaat finally had the chance to fight the "Godless" communists by working closely with the ISI and the Saudis; its members also had gained access to Saudi charity funds and lucrative jobs in Saudi Arabia. Under Zia's regime, the Jamaat wielded considerable influence over the content of textbooks and radio and television programs.

But, as the 1990s revealed, there was a price to be paid for getting in bed with dictators. The Jamaat lost one of its most important electoral bases, Karachi, to the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM). The rise of the Taliban meant an increase in the influence of its competitor and sometime ally, the Jamiat-e Ulama Islam, Deobandi '*ulama*' organization whose madrasas had been the nurseries for the young Taliban. Zia ul-Haq's rule had offered an exceptional opportunity to the Jamaat — a share in governmental power and a chance to implement Islamic programs. The Jamaat had received some short-term benefits but incurred many long-term costs. The stigma of closely collaborating with a military regime was compounded by the Jamaat's participation in an Islamization process that many Pakistanis viewed as a sham. As one of Jamaat's own leaders so aptly put it in 1985: "Islam cannot be imposed from above through martial-law decrees."³

3. Interview with Munnawar Hassan, the Vice-President of the Karachi branch of the Jamaat, April 23, 1985. Munnawar Hassan is now the Amir (head) of the Jamaat-e Islami and has become a more conservative figure.

The Legacy of Bhutto and Zia's Contending Visions and Security Policies

Lawrence Ziring

The war perpetrated by the Pakistani army in 1971 against its own Bengali population came to an end only through New Delhi's intervention and the resulting loss of East Pakistan. The now-contiguous Pakistan that re-emerged in 1972, brought to power a new government dominated by civilians and led by the charismatic Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and a new army commander, General Zia ul-Haq. This essay examines Bhutto's and Zia's contending visions for the newly reconstructed Pakistan, their differing approaches to the Kashmir dispute, and the long-lasting consequences of their actions.



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Bhutto represented the idea of a secular Pakistan based on consensus and inter-ethnic cooperation, equitable and just laws, and national order derived from constitutional constraints on the arbitrary exercise of government power. In contrast, Zia was not only the legate of a military tradition that stressed the hierarchy of power, but he also believed that governance and spiritual belief were inextricably intertwined. Importantly, and the key to their interaction, both men were flawed expressions of national leadership. Each man assumed a role larger than his personality could manage, and each imposed a legacy on Pakistan that those who followed could neither evade nor ignore.

Bhutto emphasized the need to restore the primacy of civilian government that was lost with Mohammad Ali Jinnah's death in 1948, and certainly after the 1951 assassination of Pakistan's first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan. All of the politicians who followed them had failed to address the central question of the country's democratic experiment: Could a state founded on religious sentiment adapt itself to the secular traditions and processes of the nation-state? Although Bhutto stood out from the other politicians, he was more inclined to arrogate power than promote the cause of limited government. He succeeded in developing a formidable political organization, but he came up short in demanding the subordination of the country's military establishment. Most critically, Bhutto failed to accept his role in the loss of East Pakistan, nor did he interpret accurately the impact of that loss on the country's armed forces, which, though humbled by the defeat, were not prepared to acknowledge him as their supreme leader.

Bhutto's apparent inclination to write off Kashmir, much as he did East Pakistan, by negotiating the Simla Accord with India in 1972 was more than the army was prepared to tolerate. In the immediate aftermath of the civil war, the army could only stand by as Bhutto consolidated his power, sought diplomatic arrangements with New Delhi, and managed the release of the 93,000 prisoners of war languishing in the now-independent

Bangladesh. He also selected Zia ul-Haq — an officer who was not in the country during the civil war — to lead the army, and thus appeared to have eliminated all the higher ranking officers that might have challenged his authority. Zia, however, refused to be beholden to Bhutto and moved quickly to restore the shattered image of the army and reposition it as the watchdog of the country's national interests. Bhutto's flagging popularity within his own coterie and party gave Zia the opening needed to reassert the army's power. Nowhere was this power more quickly exercised than in reversing Bhutto's Kashmir policy. Zia's strategy went beyond reordering the army. Zia, who believed neither in self-government nor in democratic norms, strove to build an Islamic state that corresponded to his perception of Pakistan's needs.

In pursuit of this aim, Zia reorganized the army to include an array of clandestine services. Acknowledging India's superiority in conventional warfare, he made a commitment to irregular operations conducted by shadow organizations resembling guerrilla units but heavily schooled in religious zealotry and prepared to make huge sacrifices in the name of faith. Thus it was Zia who authorized the restructuring and expansion of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) and made it the central operating force in the revived army. Moreover, unlike Bhutto who seemed determined to bury the hatchet with India, Zia intended to use the ISI and its jihadist off-spring to extend Pakistan's power into Indian-occupied Kashmir.

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Although Bhutto's diplomatic efforts had succeeded in bringing Islamabad and New Delhi into a formal relationship, his waning fortunes became evident in the aftermath of the 1977 elections. Bhutto was compelled to urge the army to quell street demonstrations and corral his opposition. Zia, however, had prepared for just such circumstances and used them to terminate Bhutto's rule and restore the army's position at the top of the political power structure. Believing that he had the support of the masses, Zia orchestrated the arrest, indictment for murder, trial, and hanging of the ousted Prime Minister. Thereafter, Zia launched a process of "Islamization" in the country, which, importantly, brought long-marginalized orthodox and obscurantist political organizations into the mainstream of Pakistani political life. Zia made it clear his objective was nothing less than a transformed country wedded to Islamic mores and traditions.

Under Zia's program of renewal, the army was given several additional responsibilities, the most important of which were oversight of the country's nuclear program and management of the Kashmir issue. Without emphasizing a shift in national security policy, Zia cited Kashmir as the *raison d'être* of the new Pakistan and gave the ISI broad power to assemble the jihadist organizations that would carry the fight to the Indian army in Kashmir while at the same time avoiding direct confrontation. New Delhi was reluctant to reignite major hostilities so long as the forays were limited and unlikely to change the balance of power in the region. This forbearance proved somewhat justified when the Soviet Red Army invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, compelling Pakistan to redeploy a substantial portion of its forces and intelligence service operations to the Pashtun areas in the country's northwest.

The Islamic zealotry stoked by Zia's Islamization policies were now applied to Afghanistan, where Islamabad sensed the need for a broader national security policy that not only protected Pakistan from Soviet machinations, but helped reinforce the country's defenses against any future Indian encroachment. The army had failed to prevent the loss of East Pakistan, but it was determined not to repeat that experience in the reconstituted Pakistan. Holding the Red Army at the Pakistani frontier was one strategy, but building new territorial defenses against a possible Indian thrust toward the country's heartland was equally important. Clandestine operations in Kashmir, therefore, were expanded to include Afghanistan. Therefore, what began as a supposed popular uprising in Kashmir designed to weaken India's claim quickly matured into a full-blown strategy that enlisted the services of the Afghan *mujahidin*.

Holding the Red Army at the Pakistani frontier was one strategy, but building new territorial defenses against a possible Indian thrust was equally important ... Clandestine operations in Kashmir, therefore, were expanded to include Afghanistan.

Pakistan survived, albeit in truncated form, following India's liberation of East Pakistan and the termination of the Muslim country's two-winged experiment. It survived again in the no less momentous conflict in Afghanistan. Zia's national security program was deemed to have succeeded in preserving what remained of the country, but the General left a questionable legacy. In the end, although Pakistan became the first Islamic nation to possess nuclear weapons, the country was more insecure and its future had become even more precarious. The jihadist program managed by the ISI in Kashmir assumed even larger significance in Afghanistan under the umbrella of restored civilian government. The protracted Kashmir dispute hardened prospects for a negotiated settlement with India, and Afghanistan was denied its anticipated tranquility even after the last Soviet soldier withdrew in February 1989.

Taking on a life of its own, the ISI was uninterested in solutions to vexing problems. By now too committed to its forward strategy in Afghanistan, the ISI strategized to produce an Afghan government not only tied to Islamabad, but inextricably linked to the larger Pashtun nation. Recognizing that Afghanistan would not easily fall within Pakistan's orbit, the ISI set in motion yet another irregular force, the Taliban. Sanctioned by Pakistan's civilian governments in the 1990s, the ISI provided its army of Taliban fighters with fresh recruits and arms. The Taliban conquered Kabul in 1996 and from there fanned out to the most remote areas of Afghanistan. By the next Pakistan army coup in 1999, the Taliban had taken on the mantle of Islamic crusaders. Jihadists were attracted from throughout the Muslim world, most significant among them al-Qa'ida and Usama bin Ladin. Interaction between the Taliban and al-Qa'ida was immediate and intimate, and in its initial phase the ISI, whether directly or indirectly, nourished both movements.

The Taliban and al-Qa'ida added new dimensions to the Afghan dilemma that no outsider could control. With al-Qa'ida and bin Ladin determined to formulate a far more ambitious agenda, the ISI hold on developments slipped away. Even after the United States-led coalition brought down the Taliban emirate in 2001, scattering its leaders and foot soldiers to the high mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan, the struggle continued. Al-Qa'ida likewise remained viable, moving

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between Afghanistan and Pakistan and plotting its next operation. Of the two states, however, Pakistan continued to exhibit the greater dilemma. Its questionable nuclear security, its renegade ISI remnants, and its failed social and economic programs were especially worrisome. But arguably the greatest threat to the future of Pakistan was manifested in the same jihadist irregulars that the ISI and the Pakistan army had nurtured in the unending conflict with India. By continuing to nurture jihadists, Islamabad has opened the floodgates to all manner of dissidence. Moreover, the rapport that binds the Pakistani masses to the likes of Taliban and al-Qa'ida gives new dimensions to the definition of the failed state. Thus the Bhutto-Zia confrontation continues to frame developments and events in Pakistan — events that have brought South Asia to the abyss.

III. Domestic Concerns, Regional Implications

Imperialism, Extremism, and the Withering State

Imran Ali

The multiple crises that Pakistan faces in the post-Musharraf period appear to be of an almost existential nature. The resumption of a democratically elected civilian government following the elections of February 2008, and the subsequent removal of Musharraf in mid-2008, have failed to alleviate the sense of crisis, but rather have elevated it to even the level of chaos for certain Western analysts. Perhaps as a corollary to the transition to democracy, and in contrast to their silence during the period of dictatorship, these interlocutors are depicting Pakistan as a fragile and failing state about to be overtaken by religious extremists. Having reached an impasse in Afghanistan with a foreign invasion and occupation that is already longer in duration than World War II, the West is possibly eyeing Pakistan as the next extended battleground in its Global War against Terrorism. This dangerous enterprise could include the possible balkanization of the country, if that better serves imperialist designs. This essay attempts to enquire how and why the people of Pakistan have come to face such dire prospects.

Pakistan experienced strong continuities from colonial to post-colonial political economy. The entrenched authority of a triad of power and resource absorption emerged during British rule from the construction of an extensive canal system and subsequent agricultural colonization in the Indus basin, which then served as the backbone of the Pakistani economy. The triad consisted of the military, which gained extensive landed resources through soldier settlement and breeding schemes for military animals (especially the soon-to-be obsolete cavalry horses); the civil and irrigation bureaucracy that managed this hydraulic society; and the larger landowners who were imperialism's favored intermediaries. Much more extensively, new land was allotted to the upper peasantry, comprising the traditional landowning lineages. The rural masses were excluded from proprietary or even occupancy access to canal irrigated land. Allied to the British, the landlord segment could leverage the support from the upper peasantry to determine factional access through electoral politics. Through such alliances, the nationalist movement remained stunted, and Pakistan failed to develop a counterpart to the Congress Party that stabilized Indian political economy in the half century after independence. One contributing factor was the emasculation of the professional and entrepreneurial middle class, which at Partition had to exit to India since it was predominantly non-Muslim.

In Pakistan, the ruling triad, in its endeavor to deny democracy to the people, went back for support in the post-colonial era to the new imperial hegemon, the United States. The



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repeated relapse into military dictatorship cemented this relationship of vassalage, with the US preferring to deal with military autocrats over elected politicians, but also demanding of the military a role ever more malign for the welfare of Pakistan itself. For a poverty stricken country, the maintenance of a million-strong military was hardly justified by the presumed objective: defense against Indian belligerence. More likely, Western interests were being served by having a sizeable and pliant force abreast of western Asia's oil resources, and to provide a counter for any southern expansion by the Soviet Union. Like the British Indian army, maintained from domestic revenues, the fiscal burden of maintaining the Pakistani military was met by the hapless people of Pakistan itself. With the failure of substantive direct taxation, through a combination of inefficiency and corruption, but also to placate intermediary groups, the shift in revenue generation to indirect taxes, especially from the early 1990s, placed this material burden squarely on the masses. Moreover, the opportunity cost of the deprivation of democracy, and of the starving of social sector funding, was incalculable.

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The shift in vassalage to a more onerous mode in the 1980s, under the Zia-ul-Haq dictatorship, involved the CIA-sponsored "*jihad*" against the Soviets in Afghanistan. The West could gloat over the winning of a bloodless independence for eastern Europe and the Central Asian republics; at the cost, however, of a million dead and over five million displaced in Afghanistan, and with Pakistan awash with drugs and arms. The last, along with the breakdown in transparency and accountability, was the price paid to local intermediaries for their incipient lack of opposition to the Afghan "*jihad*." The enhanced foreign assistance under Zia was another way to feed rent-seeking intermediaries, whether in business, the public sector, politics, or the intelligentsia. Significantly, prior to and after the Zia dictatorship, peri-

ods of civilian rule saw dramatically reduced foreign aid flows; and in the 1990s, Pakistan was not only demonized at the behest of India, but even suffered sanctions for responding to India's nuclear tests. The economic malaise that Pakistan suffered constituted the opportunity cost of not having dictatorship.

Currently, and several years into the imperialist invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, anarcho-vassalage in Pakistan has taken an even more virulent turn. With the emergence of a movement of national resistance in Afghanistan, narrated in the West through such euphemisms as "Taliban insurgency" and "al-Qa'ida terrorism," and with the resurgence in that country of a narco-economy under the noses of US-NATO occupation forces, the regionalization of the war and its inevitable spread to Pakistan has gained lethal momentum. The repeated killing of civilians in both countries by the "civilized" West, and grave misgivings over its long term designs, has forsaken support for its cause. Simultaneously, the legitimacy of an already frayed vassal apparatus has suffered further erosion, as Pakistan has been goaded into killing its own people, while the roots of the problem lie in the continued foreign occupation of a neighboring country. There can be no blank check for civil war: military action against internal enemies is only viable if accompanied by an expeditious phaseout of occupation troops from Afghanistan. Meanwhile, an emerging politicized and alarmist narrative of chaos-mongering on Pakistan's own viability, from "experts" centered on Washington's military-security establishment, is a further destabiliz-

ing element. This has a detrimental impact on business and investment confidence, and on international perceptions.

This is not to say that the “Taliban” in Pakistan should not be confronted. They pose an evident threat to national stability, and a misogynist challenge to civilized values. The solution, however, does not lie and cannot be achieved in Pakistan. It rests solidly with the exit of Western occupation forces from Afghanistan, without which peace appears unattainable. The prolonging of Western aggression could lead “withering” Pakistan itself to spiral into uncontrollable instability, the consequences of which are difficult to comprehend. However, just as the “Taliban” appear unconscionably committed to their Islamist extremism, the West is also likely to remain hostage to its entrenched imperialist values, mindless of the slaughter of Muslims that such policies have perpetrated since the mid-20th century. Regardless of the truth, there are apprehensions in Pakistan that violent militancy is being funded by India, the United States, and Israel. It appears that sectarian tension has for some time been encouraged by Saudi Arabia and Iran, using a poor country for a proxy conflict.

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External interventions have combined with internal weaknesses and distortions to enhance the complexity of Pakistan’s problems. The failed elite has violated moral economy through deinstitutionalization, extreme economic inequality and continued resource transfer, processes which the Western-preferred military rule has actively abetted. The Pakistani establishment also failed to curb a growing *madrasa* culture and *jihadi* mobilization, operating under cover of a general over-emphasis on religion and cultural atavism. Through misgovernance, public mismanagement, and a lack of services, the state had already ceded much control on the ground to virtually criminalized intermediaries. This has left a void that could be exploited by religious radicalism. The Pakistani people need a national movement to gain real, rather than nominal, freedom, but this might now metamorphasize into foreign aggression, civil war, or violent revolution.

Despite the challenges it faces, Pakistan can hardly be written off as a failing state. With the world’s largest contiguous irrigation system, a cultivated area in excess of 20 million hectares, a livestock herd equivalent in numbers to that of the EU and USA, and an extensive arable crop mix, the country has huge potential for food and textile production. In most economic and social indicators — including telecommunications densities, per capita exports, and energy consumption — Pakistan remains ahead of India. With improvements in the existing low level of regional economic integration, Pakistan can benefit from increased trade and investment flows within South Asia. High population growth levels can be an opportunity, but also pose risks for political stability. Unlike the global recessionary trends, demand levels remain high in Pakistan, straining supply systems and creating inflationary spirals. While intensely involved in the geo-strategic elements of globalization, Pakistan has been a neglected area for international investment. Therefore, it is imperative that regional peace be secured, otherwise the welfare of 180 million people will be further threatened.

Upheaval in West and South Asia: Public Opinion in Pakistan

Ijaz Shafi Gilani

The year 1979 was a time of great upheaval throughout Asia. Given the importance of the critical events of that year to Pakistan and the wider region, it is interesting to examine in retrospect how the Pakistani public at the time perceived them. This essay first sets the context for exploring these public attitudes. It then summarizes Pakistani opinion on major foreign policy and domestic issues, drawing upon the surveys carried out by the author under the auspices of the Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion, the Pakistani affiliate of the Gallup International Association during the year 1979.¹

SETTING THE CONTEXT

Situated between West Asia and South Asia, Pakistan has become an active theater of conflict and convulsion. In hindsight, one could say that 1979 was the year when the seeds were sown for a globally active Islamist Pakistan. The new “Globalized Pakistan” positioned its foreign policy as staunchly anti-Soviet and its domestic policy as passionately Islamist.

The year 1979 was United States President Jimmy Carter’s last year in office. The Carter Administration was suspicious of the new, undemocratic military regime in Pakistan, which introduced a set of punishments (mostly against political activities) that blended British colonial penal practices with Islamic criminal law and accelerated Pakistan’s nuclear program.

Initially, the Pakistani military regime had to expend much effort to sell the Americans on its ability to become a “frontline” state against Soviet aggression. The American government appeared divided on whether to treat the expulsion of the last of the royal family in Afghanistan by a civilian Marxist leadership as a positive or a negative step, particularly when it had enjoyed close working relationship with at least some of the Afghan Marxists.

On the Pakistani domestic scene, the situation in 1979 was best captured by the April 5 hanging of former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.



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1. All surveys were nationwide, conducted in both rural and urban areas of all four provinces of the country. The sample comprised nearly 1,700 adults from a cross-section of various age, income, education, and language backgrounds. At the end of the essay, the findings are presented in tabular form.

Views on the Iranian Revolution

In April 1979, Pakistani views on the Iranian Revolution were divided. The first and largest group (35%) of respondents believed that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was better than his predecessor, Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi; a second group (25%) thought the Shah was better. The third group (30%) was still undecided (See Table 1.1). In later years, as the revolution consolidated, a larger majority tended to favor the revolution.

Among detractors of the revolution, there was considerable concern about the imposition of death penalties. When asked in a national poll, 40% opposed such punishment, 28% favored it, and 32% said they did not know (See Table 1.2).

Views on Afghanistan

This was the year when the avowedly Socialist/Marxist regime of Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin ruled Afghanistan. They had overthrown the government of President Muhammad Daud Khan. Daud, Crown Prince and cousin of King Zahir Shah, had ruled Afghanistan since 1973 when he overthrew the king and abrogated monarchy. But the regime had remained largely intact.

Public opinion in Pakistan was opposed to the Tarakai-Amin government. When asked whether this government would last or collapse, 48% of a national sample in Pakistan believed it would quickly collapse. Only 8% thought it would last. Forty-four percent said they did not know (See Table 2.1). As for the Afghan refugees who had started to arrive in Pakistan in large numbers, 81% of the respondents believed they should be welcomed and helped, 10% opposed such an effort, and 9% did not give a view (See Table 2.2).

80% of Pakistanis named Saudi Arabia in an open-ended question which asked: "Which Muslim majority country (other than Pakistan itself) did they like the most."

Views on Saudi Arabia and Muslim World Issues

Notwithstanding the political turmoil caused by the violent takeover of the Holy Mosque in Mecca in November 1979, 80% of Pakistanis named Saudi Arabia in an open-ended question which asked: "Which Muslim majority country (other than Pakistan itself) did they like the most." The only other country that made the list was Libya at 3% (See Table 4.1).

This same year Egyptian President Anwar Sadat travelled to Jerusalem, breaking the boycott of relations with Israel. The

Pakistanis surveyed largely opposed Sadat's move. When asked whether Sadat's initiative was in or against the interest of Muslims, only 11% supported the move, 44% opposed it, and 45% did not know (See Table 4.2).

Although the Saudi leadership was viewed with great respect in Pakistan, interestingly, in 1979, Colonel Mu'ammarr Qadhafi was a close runner-up as most popular Muslim leader. He was seen as an outspoken leader who supported

[W]hen asked their views on whether Pakistan should proceed to acquire nuclear weapons, 90% of the respondents favored doing so, 6% opposed, and 4% said they did not know.

Pakistan's nuclear program and also as someone who had stood by the late Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in his last difficult days. In response to the question of who, among Muslim world leaders, did they most like, 55% of those surveyed identified the Saudi king (44% mentioned King Fahd, 10% mentioned the late King Faysal). Colonel Qadhafi was next at 34%. Yasir 'Arafat was third at 12%. A number of other leaders were mentioned at much lower levels of approval, such as King Husayn of Jordan (5%), Anwar Sadat of Egypt (4%), Hafiz al-Asad of Syria (4%), and Sultan Nahyan of the UAE (3%) (See Table 4.3).

Views on the United States

In the aftermath of General Zia ul-Haq's establishment of martial law and continued insistence on pursuing the nuclear program, the Carter Administration had terminated Pakistan's economic aid program and imposed a variety of sanctions on the country. Opinion was sought to gauge the level of resentment on this issue. Apparently, the views among the Pakistani public at the time were mixed. The respondents were asked: "Should the United States offer to resume its economic aid operations in Pakistan, should it [Pakistan] accept or reject such offer?" Fourth-six percent (46%) counselled acceptance, while 43% favored rejecting such as offer. The remaining 11% did not know (See Table 3.1).

However, a very large majority of those polled favored continuing the nuclear program, which was an important bone of contention between the US and Pakistan. Thus, when asked their views on whether Pakistan should proceed to acquire nuclear weapons, 90% of the respondents favored doing so, 6% opposed, and 4% said they did not know (See Table 3.2).

On the whole, Pakistanis appeared in 1979 to be latecomer adherents to the idea of non-alignment. In response to a polling question on this subject, 58% favored non-alignment in world politics, 22% favored choosing sides in the Cold War, and 20% said they did not know (See Table 3.3).

China was the nation most trusted or liked by those surveyed. Choosing among the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and China, 34% mentioned China as the country they regarded most favorably, as opposed to a mere 7% for the United States, 6% for France, and 2% for the Soviet Union. A large proportion of the sample, 47%, did not answer (See Table 3.4).

The Soviet Union at the time was seen as a close second to the United States as a global power. When asked about which of the two countries they considered more powerful, 33% ranked the United States on top, 22% placed the Soviet Union on top, and 16% believed they were an equal match. The remaining 29% did not answer (See Table 3.5).

PAKISTANI POPULAR OPINION — THE DOMESTIC SCENE

A new alignment of views whereby the Pakistani population was split between pro-Bhutto and anti-Bhutto opinions was forged in the years 1977-79. This alignment would come to dominate national politics in Pakistan for the next quarter of a century. It should therefore be of interest to read some facets of that opinion in 1979.

34% mentioned China as the country they regarded most favorably, as opposed to a mere 7% for the United States, 6% for France, and 2% for the Soviet Union.

The Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), whose head, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had been hung earlier in the year, was perceived by most Pakistanis as the likely winner if elections were held that year: 29% held that view, while just 16% viewed the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) as the likely winner (See Table 5.1). The PNA had emerged as an alliance of anti-Bhutto political parties during the 1977 elections and a popular movement to remove Bhutto after the elections, which were seen as flawed by the opposition. However, many mentioned the PNA's component parties as the likely winners. None, though, exceeded 4%. In fact, by this time, the PNA had started to split apart; the answer to this question was a good indication of that split. The PNA constituted a mix of religious parties, Jamaat-e Islami, Jamaat-e Ulema-e Pakistan, and Jamaat ul-Ulema-e Islam, as well as the conservative Muslim League and small parties, the profile of whose voters and organizational structures was fairly similar to the Muslim League. Together this group had scored more votes than the Peoples Party in the 1970 Elections (PPP: 39%; three religious parties: 21%; Muslim League: 23%). In the 1977 elections and post-election protest movement, the PPP had been defeated due to its total isolation from the Islamists, traditionalists, and even the secular nationalist parties of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan.

In 1979, while the PPP constituency was able to withstand pressure from the military and retain its voter base, the PNA began to break up. While the religious parties still held their voters through party discipline, the Muslim League became an empty shell, whose followers were either attracted to the PNA or became inactive. This decline of the Muslim League and rise of the religious parties in the anti-Bhutto constituency continued until about 1985. But 1979 can be seen as the year in which the Pakistan National Alliance disintegrated.

However, while the PNA disintegrated, the anti-Bhutto constituency did not. In fact, it was further consolidated. The divisive events of 1979, notably the execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the suppression of PPP activists by the military government, deepened the cleavages between the two political tendencies of Pakistani politics. Bhuttoism never became

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an ideology, but it did turn into a political platform. It attracted a significant share of the Pakistani electorate — those who loved Bhutto and his legacy. But possibly a larger number aligned themselves in direct opposition to Bhuttoism. For the next ten years, until his death in a plane crash. General Zia ul-Haq rode the crest of the anti-Bhutto constituency.

CONCLUSION

The 1979 survey data help to capture the popular mood and attitudes of a period of great upheaval throughout West and South Asia and in Pakistan itself. The data not only record the public's views of critically important events occurring outside the country but also reveal 1979 as an important landmark in aligning Pakistani politics away from traditional cleavages to Bhuttoism as the defining political battle for years to come.

ON THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION

Table 1.1

Question: Is the new Government of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran superior to the Shah's regime?

	Percent of Respondents
Superior	35%
Inferior	25%
Nothing can be said as yet	30%

Table 1.2

Question: Are the death penalties in Iran appropriate?

	Percent of Respondents
Yes	28%
No	40%
No Opinion	32%

ON AFGHANISTAN

Table 2.1

Question: In your view, will the present Afghan government continue or soon dissolve?

	Percent of Respondents
Continue	8%
Dissolve soon	48%
No opinion	44%

Table 2.2

Question: Should the Pakistani government assist the Afghan *Mujahidin*?

	Percent of Respondents
Should assist	81%
Should not assist	10%
No Opinion	9%

*ON THE UNITED STATES***Table 3.1**

Question: The US has stopped aid to Pakistan. If the US now desired to assist Pakistan again, should the latter accept this offer?

	Percent of Respondents
Accept	46%
Should not accept	43%
No Opinion	11%

Table 3.2

Question: Should Pakistan build an atom bomb?

	Percent of Respondents
Yes	90%
No	6%
No Opinion	4%

Table 3.3

Question: Should Pakistan remain non-aligned or associate with a superpower?

	Percent of Respondents
Should remain non-aligned	58%
Should remain associated with some superpower	22%
No Opinion	20%

Table 3.4

Question: Which country is most liked by you among the US, UK, USSR, China, and France?

	Percent of Respondents
China	34%
US	7%
UK	6%
USSR	2%
France	2%
No Opinion	47%

Table 3.5

Question: Which country is more powerful in your view: the USA or the USSR?

	Percent of Respondents
US	33%
USSR	22%
Equally strong	16%
No Opinion	29%

ON SAUDI ARABIA AND THE MUSLIM WORLD

Table 4.1

Question: Which country is most liked by you among the Muslim countries, in addition to Pakistan?

	Percent of Respondents
Saudi Arabia	80%
Libya	3%
Others	4%
UAE	1%
No Opinion	2%

Table 4.2

Question: In your view, is the accord arrived at between Egypt and Israel beneficial to Muslims or not?

	Percent of Respondents
Beneficial	11%
Not beneficial	44%
No Opinion	45%

Table 4.3

Question: Who are your most liked leaders among leaders of the Muslim countries?

	Percent of Respondents
Shah Fahd	44%
Shah Faysal	10%
Qadhafi	34%
Yasir 'Arafat	12%
King Husayn of Jordan	5%
Zia ul Haq	6%
Anwar Sadat	4%
Hafiz al-Asad	4%
Sultan Nayhan	3%

*DOMESTIC SCENE***Table 5.1**

Question: In your view, which party will succeed in national polls?

	Percent of Respondents
PPP	29%
PNA	16%
JUP	4%
JI	1%
ML	1%
IP	2%
None	10%
Different parties in different provinces	4%
Polls will not be held	3%
No Opinion	30%

Source: Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion (the Pakistani affiliate of the Gallup International Association), National Opinion Poll, 1979.

Pakistan's Non-Proliferation Policy

Zulfqar Khan

Since 1979, Pakistan has emerged as a nuclear weapons state. A great deal of attention has focused recently on just three aspects of Pakistan's nuclear program: the 1998 nuclear tests, the revelations surrounding the activities of A.Q. Khan, and the issue of the security of nuclear materials and facilities in the face of the country's battle against extremists. As a result, the longevity and extensiveness not only of the nuclear program, but also of Pakistan's non-proliferation efforts have been obscured.



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In fact, Pakistan's non-proliferation policy dates from the 1950s. Beginning in the 1950s, Pakistan has established a number of institutions and mechanisms to oversee nuclear power generation and to manage safety and security issues in accordance with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities document, which was used as the model for inspection and enforcement objectives.¹ (See Table 1)

The principles of Pakistan's nuclear non-proliferation policy were premised on adherence to the ideals and norms of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of 1968, despite Pakistan's non-acceptance of the Treaty. The Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) was established on January 22, 2001 under the obligation of International Nuclear Safety Convention Article 8(2) to ensure effective separation between the functions of the regulatory body (PNRA) and those of any other body or organization concerned with the promotion or utilization of nuclear energy.

Since the nuclear explosions of May 1998, Pakistan has extensively reorganized the different departments dealing with nuclear facilities (See Table 2) in an effort to augment their security, acting as a responsible nuclear weapon state. Pakistan consistently has striven to fulfil its obligations under the diverse elements of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, including specifically with respect to United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR Res) 1540, issued on April 28, 2004. Consonant with UNSCR Res 1540, Pakistan instituted a host of non-proliferation legislation/measures. In fact, even earlier (i.e., after the 1998 nuclear tests), Pakistan had strengthened export control mechanisms in order to prevent the illicit proliferation of weapons of mass destruction-related (WMD) technologies and their means of delivery to any entity, including to non-state actors.

1. This document ((INFCIRC/225) continues to serve as the basis for the IAEA Code of Conduct on Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM).

Table 1: History of Nuclear Safety in Pakistan

Organization	Objectives	Year
A twelve-member Atomic Energy Committee was set-up	Explore scientific and industrial applications for nuclear energy	1954
Pakistan Atomic Energy Research Council (PAERC)	Promote nuclear technology	1956
Pakistan Nuclear Safety Committee	Ensure nuclear safety	1964
Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology (PINSTECH)	Conduct research and development for peaceful uses of atomic energy	1965
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)	Develop nuclear power and fuel-cycle facilities; promote research on peaceful uses of atomic energy	1965
Centre of Nuclear Studies (CNS)	Train Pakistani scientists/engineers	1969
Nuclear Safety & Licensing Division	Ensure nuclear safety	1970
Directorate of Nuclear Safety & Radiation Protection	Ensure nuclear safety and radiation protection	1984
Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Board (PNRB)	Regulate nuclear safety	1994
Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA)	Responsibility for formulation of regulations and their implementation	2001
Directorate of Safety (DOS)	Created to cater to the safety needs of PAEC	2002

Table 2: Pakistan's Export Control/Execution Architecture

Institution/Regime	Subsidiary Institutions/Bodies/Basic Principles
National Command Authority – NCA	➤ Strategic Plans Division – SPD ➤ Strategic Commands & Security Division ➤ Employment Control Committee ➤ Development Control Committee ➤ Arms Control & Disarmament Agency
Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority – PNRA	• Licensing of all the nuclear/radiological facilities ➤ Safety and security of facilities ➤ Functions under the President/PM Offices ➤ Augments Nuclear Safety Convention ➤ Signed Illicit Trafficking Data Base-IAEA to share data on seizures
Container Security Initiative – CSI	• Pakistan has signed a MoU with the US, and it was designated the Model State for the Pilot Programme of the CSI ➤ Pakistan-US Customs ➤ Declaration of Principles of the CSI ➤ Manning of scanners at entry/exit points ➤ Pakistan-US Customs direct network links ➤ Intelligence Agencies ➤ Border/coast guards/maritime agencies
Mega Port Initiative-MPI	• Consultations in progress
Export Control Act 2004	• Mechanism to criminalize/prosecute offenders ➤ Imprisonment up to 14 years ➤ Fine of up to Rs. 5 million ➤ Confiscation of property/assets
Statutory Regulatory Orders – SROs	• In vogue since the early 1950s ➤ Relevant Customs acts
National Control List – NCL	• Based on the EU/NSG/Australia Group/MTCR Models ➤ Listing of NBC-related technologies/materials ➤ Periodical reviewing/updating
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Ordinance – 2000	• Pakistan is party to the CWC ➤ Strengthens export/re-export/trans-shipment of goods ➤ Jurisdiction over overseas Pakistanis as well ➤ Regulates technologies/materials/equipments ➤ Possesses National Authority on CWC in Foreign Office
BWC – signed in 1974	• Pakistan is party to the BWC ➤ Meets all the existing obligations ➤ However, no mechanism is embedded in the BWC to verify compliance by the state parties ➤ Biological/delivery aspects covered by the Export Control Act 2004
Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) – Approved by the Government of Pakistan in 2007	• To ensure the overall implementation of the Export Control Act 2004 & the Export Policy Procedure Order 2006 • It would also have an independent Oversight Board to supervise the implementation of Export Control Act 2004 ➤ Initially function under the Foreign Office ➤ Subsequently, to take a shape of an independent division ➤ To control the export of nuclear, missile technology, biological agents, and toxins-related items

In addition to the safety and security measures/architecture for Pakistan's nuclear assets and facilities previously mentioned, the following non-proliferation laws are now in force:

- December 22, 1998: The PAEC Directorate of the Pakistan Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (PNSRP) promulgated new regulations concerning the physical protection of nuclear materials/facilities in the PNSRP Regulations 1990.
- July 1998, February 1999, and August 1999: Pakistan enacted three statutory regulatory orders to prevent the export of fissionable material; and to make mandatory “no objection certificates” for the export of nuclear substances, radioactive materials, and nuclear energy-related equipment.
- February 17, 2004: The Ministry of Commerce published amendments to the Imports and Exports (Control) Act of 1950 and to the Export Policy and Procedures Order of 2000, thereby reconciling these pieces of legislation in conformity with the new requirements.
- September 14, 2004: The National Assembly adopted the Nuclear Export Control Bill aimed at preventing the proliferation of sensitive technologies in accordance with UNSCR Res 1540. (On October 5, 2004, PNRA also published a new Regulation in this regard.)
- 2005: In accordance with the Nuclear Security Action Plan (of the PNRA), Pakistan joined the IAEA's Illicit Trafficking Data Base (ITDB) information system, thereby agreeing to share data on seizures with the Agency.
- April 13, 2005: Pakistan endorsed the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism initiative in the UN General Assembly.
- October 2005: Pakistan issued fresh lists of technologies and materials related to the nuclear and biological weapons that will be subject to an intrusive export control system. Pakistan also issued a comprehensive National Control List (NCL) of various controlled items based on the European Union (EU) system of classification/model and the lists drawn up by the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
- September 2006: Pakistan supported the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and its Plan of Action in the General Assembly, which was supposed to advance 1540s' objectives. Pakistan established a Strategic Export Control Division in 2007 under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which also has an Oversight Board that would independently supervise the implementation of the Export Control Act 2004 and the other laws relating to the illicit trafficking and export control mechanisms.
- June 2007: Pakistan joined the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which demonstrates its determination to effectively uproot the menace of nuclear proliferation.
- August 2008: During the Inter-Sessional Process Meeting of Experts to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Pakistan endorsed the basic objectives of the Convention regime.

In addition, as reflected in Tables 3-5, Pakistan is a signatory to a host of international conventions; most of its nuclear facilities are under IAEA safeguards; and the PNRA is vigilantly enforcing stringent safety and security measures.²

Table 3: Pakistan's Safeguarded Nuclear Facilities

Facilities	IAEA Safeguards
Pakistan Research Reactor-1-2	Yes
Karachi Nuclear Power Plant	Yes
Chashma Nuclear Power Plant-1	Yes
Chashma Nuclear Power Plant (CHASNUPP-1) and CHASNUPP -2 (in advanced stages of construction)	Yes
PINSTECH	Yes

Table 4: Pakistan's Ratification of Different Conventions

Conventions
Convention on Nuclear Safety
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident
Convention on Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
Biological Weapons Convention
Chemical Weapons Convention

Table 5: PNRA's Regulations

Regulation on the Licensing of NPPs (Nuclear Power Plants) - (PAK/909)
Regulation on the Safety in NPP Design (PAK/911)
Regulation on the Safety in NPP Quality Assurance (PAK/912)
Regulation on Radiation Protection (PAK/904)
Regulation on the Licensing of Facilities other than NPPs (PAK/908)
Regulation on the Safety in NPP Operations (PAK/913)
Regulation for Radioactive Waste Management in Pakistan (PAK/915)
Regulation on the Safety in NPP Sites (PAK/910)
Regulation for Transportation of Radioactive Waste in Pakistan (PAK/916)
Regulation on Management of a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (PAK/914)
Regulation for Licensing of safety class equipment and component manufacture (PAK/907)

2. For the command and control structure of Pakistan's National Command Authority (NCA), see, "Nuclear Weapons R&D Organizations in Nine Nations," *Congressional Research Service* (March 16, 2009) available at www.crs.gov

SUPPORTING PAKISTAN'S NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS

According to Ken Berry of the East-West Institute, regardless of the A. Q. Khan nuclear network's activities, the latest crises caused by the Taliban/terrorists in the tribal areas, and the over-stretching of Pakistan's armed forces, "Pakistan's nuclear assets apparently remained under the firm control of not only the military, but also the large, specially trained security force created precisely to protect those assets."³ Nevertheless, in a globalized world, where non-state actors can move freely from country-to-country, the proliferation risks are real — as Pakistani officials readily acknowledge and have taken numerous steps to reduce.

The international community's assistance to Pakistan in bolstering security around its nuclear facilities would go a long way towards strengthening its safety and security apparatus and non-proliferation mechanisms. Since 2001, the United States and Pakistan reportedly have been cooperating with each other on nuclear (and biological) safety and security, including the provision of US support in the form of equipment and training.⁴ This and other similar collaboration should be sustained and further elaborated in order to bolster Pakistan's increasingly extensive non-proliferation efforts and thus strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime — in spite of its discriminatory aspects.

3. Ken Berry, "How Safe Are Pakistan's Nuclear Facilities?" *EastWest Institute Policy Paper 2/2008* (February 2008), <http://www.ewi.info/pdf/SecurityPakistan.pdf>

4. In this context, the US Central Command urged its allies "to provide technical advice and assistance in strengthening government capacity, such as improving Pakistani institutions ... In 2009-2010 the Taliban's momentum must be reversed ... and the international community must work with Pakistan to disrupt the threats to security along Pakistan's western border;" *United States Central Command – White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on US Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan*, Department of Defense (March 2009), http://www.centcom.mil/index2.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1424&pop See also remarks by nuclear expert Leonard Spector, who stated that, "the United States has been working with Pakistan pretty actively for the last decade to try to enhance security and to share kind of best practices that we have. So I think in that sense, there really probably has been substantial improvement." Remarks delivered at the conference on "Nuclear Crisis Points: Iran, North Korea, Syria and Pakistan," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, April 6, 2009.

Thirty Years after 1979: Is Pakistan Changing Its Strategic Paradigm?

Jean-Luc Racine

While the partition of the British Raj was supposed to offer the Muslims of India, along with a new country, the solution to their problems, the first war between India and Pakistan started as early as 1947, under the guise of what later became one of the classic modes of operation of the State of Pakistan: “free” militias supposed to fight on their own to liberate Kashmir. After two more wars (in 1965 and 1971), Kashmir constantly was defined as “the core issue” to be resolved before the relationship between India and Pakistan could be normalized. Beyond Kashmir, the trust deficit between the two countries is fed by the ideological legacy of the “two nations theory,” which provided the rationale for a separate Muslim homeland free from Hindu supremacy and by the controversies about common goods, particularly the Indus waters. The mistrust was deliberately entertained in textbooks, and it increased when Indian support of Bengali insurgents compelled Pakistani troops to surrender in Dhaka, before East Pakistan seceded in 1971, becoming Bangladesh. The loss of its Eastern province brought more coherence to a now-diminished Pakistan centered on the Indus valley, but increased a lasting sense of vulnerability. On both fronts, in fact, Pakistan had uneasy neighbors, for Afghanistan has never formally recognized as an official border the Durand Line, which was inherited from the British and cuts across Pashtun territory. The first Indian nuclear test conducted in 1974 increased this sense of fragility, and pushed the Pakistani Army to redefine its strategic paradigm: in order to counter India’s superior conventional forces, Pakistan had to search for “strategic depth” and henceforth increase its influence in Afghanistan, in order to reduce the risk of being squeezed between India and an eventually pro-India regime in Kabul.



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In this context, the entry of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan in late 1979 offered General Zia ul-Haq a wonderful opportunity to gain — in the short run — on all fronts. Turning Pakistan into a frontline state against the Soviets, Zia gained the active support of the United States to help the Afghan *mujahidin* fight the Red Army in what was to become the last major Cold War theater before the collapse of the USSR. The execution of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was forgotten. Provisionally forgotten as well was the clandestine Pakistani nuclear program. When Soviet troops left Afghanistan ten years later, Zia had died in a suspect plane crash, but his policy endured. The Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) was now the most powerful tool in the hands of the army for deploying a strategy of extending Pakistan’s influence across borders. When a genuine local insurgency emerged in 1989 against Indian rule in Kashmir, Pakistan helped the Kashmiri insurgents fight Indian forces. Success was uncertain, and Islamabad decided

in 1993 to inject irregulars who had been recruited by Islamist militias protected by the ISI, such as the Laskhar-e Taiba, in India-governed Kashmir. On the West, when the Islamabad-supported *mujahidin* (particularly the Hezb-e Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar) failed to control Kabul for good, Islamabad launched a new militia, the Taliban, recruited from the *madrasas* of Afghan refugees that had been established in Pakistan. They took over Kabul in 1996, and welcomed to their emirate a veteran of the anti-Soviet war, Usama bin Ladin.

September 11 changed the rules of the game, although not completely. The new strongman of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf, made Pakistan a pro-US frontline state again — this time against the Taliban. While Musharraf arrested a number of top al-Qa'ida leaders, he allowed the Taliban to establish sanctuaries inside the Federally Administered Tribal

The delay with which Musharraf reacted during the siege of the radical Red Mosque in Islamabad in 2007 was matched by the delay with which Kayani ... reacted to the challenges raised by the Pakistani Taliban ...

Areas (FATA) after the fall of their regime in Afghanistan. He did condemn the terrorist attacks against the Indian Parliament in December 2001, and even declared in January 2002 that Pakistan did not support the concept of jihad across borders. If he restrained the jihadists operating in Kashmir, he did not dismantle their camps or their organizations. This policy of ambiguity attempted to preserve the established strategic paradigm under the constraints of the new international context. Musharraf moved on Kashmir, “pushing aside” the old UN resolutions calling for an improbable referendum, and opening a “composite dialogue” with India. However, he did not accept the Line of Control (LOC) as a possible border. On his western flank, Musharraf sent the Army into the FATA for the first time. He tried to strike

deals with local chieftains against the foreign allies of the Taliban, but not against the Taliban themselves. These half-baked measures were too much for Islamist radicals, who tried to kill Musharraf twice in 2003, but too little for India and for the Bush Administration, who were concerned about the Taliban revival in Afghanistan in 2005-2006.

The new civilian government elected in early 2008 and the new Army chief selected by Musharraf in 2007, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, face the same dilemma as their predecessors, but in a much degraded context. A new force has emerged on the front of radical Islam: the Pakistani Taliban, strongly established in the FATA with Beitullah Mehsud's militia in South Waziristan, and in the Swat valley under the leadership of Fazlullah. The delay with which Musharraf reacted during the siege of the radical Red Mosque in Islamabad in 2007 was matched by the delay with which Kayani (and new President Asif Ali Zardari) reacted to the challenges raised by the Pakistani Taliban and by the terrorist networks striking across Pakistan. When the odd agreement struck in February 2009 with Sufi Mohammad, a relative of Fazlullah, collapsed in May, the Army finally decided to act in Swat, under strong pressure from Washington, and at the cost of a million refugees.

For more than six decades, Pakistan has defined India as a structural threat. For three decades, Islamabad has used Islamist fighters as instruments for the sake of its strategic paradigm: the Afghan *mujahidin* in the 1980s, then the Pakistani jihadists in Kashmir and the Afghan Taliban in the 1990s. Today, this policy is unsustainable for three reasons. First, a

segment of the old jihadist networks has turned against the state and indulge in terrorist attacks targeting the country's civilians and security forces. Second, the new Pakistani Taliban have built up strongholds they are trying to expand in territories where the primacy of the state is negated. Third, Washington has become impatient with Pakistan's weak (or inefficient) resolve to fight the extremists, particularly since the Obama Administration defined the new "AfPak" concept.

A few years ago, General Musharraf was the first military chief to concede that the major threat to Pakistan was now "internal." It remains to be seen if the Army has fully accepted this judgment, and has drawn from it the right conclusions. As long as the answer to this question is not clear, India will not redefine with full confidence its relationship with Pakistan, particularly after the terrorist attacks launched in Mumbai in November 2008. The US administration alone will not be able to break the deadlock. The 60-year-old partition syndrome might weaken. Many Pakistanis would accept better relations with India. But turning the page opened by Zia ul-Haq 30 years ago is another challenge, whose key is still in the hands of the military.

IV. Women and Minorities

The Pakistani Shi'a

Hassan Abbas

The Shi'a Muslims of Pakistan, constituting roughly 18-20% of the country's 170 million inhabitants, are a vibrant and energetic minority. Shi'a financial and political leaders, including Pakistan's founding father Muhammad 'Ali Jinnah, played important roles in the Pakistan movement of the 1940s. Since then, they largely have remained part of the political mainstream. Traditionally, they have been well represented in the country's civilian and military power structures, and in the media.

The marginalization and, in some cases, the victimization of the Shi'a minority is a recent phenomenon rooted in three critically important events of the late 1970s: the redefinition of Pakistan by the military dictator, General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the consequent Afghan "jihad" sponsored by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the West; and the Islamic Revolution in Iran. These developments changed the status of Pakistani Shi'ites in dramatic ways.

THE REDEFINITION OF PAKISTAN UNDER GENERAL ZIA

By and large, Pakistani Shi'ites always had aligned themselves with liberal and progressive political parties. Being a minority, it suited them to remain close to comparatively secular and non-religious political forces. Their en-bloc support for the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto-led Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s substantiates this. Before the rise of General Zia, who was a conservative Sunni with Deobandi inclinations, Shi'a-Sunni relations in the country largely had been peaceful and cordial (though some sectarian conflict did occur in 1960s in a limited area in Sindh province). Zia's "Islamization" policies, which were meant to introduce Sunni Hanafi law in the country, changed this. Zia used religion to legitimize unconstitutional acts. In the name of "Islamic reforms," he severely damaged the sectarian harmony in the country. Sunni and Ahl-e Hadith (Wahhabi-influenced) political parties largely supported these efforts. However, Shi'ites rose in protest under Mufti Jafar Hussein, a leading Shi'a cleric, who resigned in protest from the official Council of Islamic Ideology.

THE IMPACT OF IRANIAN DEVELOPMENTS ON PAKISTAN

Parallel to the religious transformation imposed on Pakistan by Zia, the rise of Shi'ism as a popular religious symbol in Iran under the inspirational leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini significantly influenced Pakistani Shi'ites. Even some Sunni politi-



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cal forces, such as Jamaat-e Islami initially supported the revolution in Iran, seeing in it a model for Pakistan and a role for themselves. In contrast, Pakistani Shi'a initially were reluctant to take a clear position, because historically they had been supportive of the Shah of Iran and were more connected with the Iraqi Shi'a clerical establishment, who believed in remaining aloof from the political arena. This began to change as the younger Shi'a generation in Pakistan was galvanized. Young Pakistani Shi'ites felt empowered by the rise of "Shi'a" Iran and attracted to the anti-imperialist and revolutionary tone of the movement in Iran.

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The year 1979 also marks the emergence of the Tehrik-e Nifaz-e fiqh-e Jafria (the Movement for the Implementation of Jafaria Law, or TNFJ). Through the TNFJ, Pakistani Shi'ites started demanding from the Zia government a) the recognition of Shi'a law by the courts and the appointment of Shi'a 'ulama' to judicial positions, b) the formation of a Shi'a *Waqf* (endowment) Board, and c) Shi'a representation in educational committees tasked with crafting the country's educational policies. The Shi'a minority threatened

Zia with agitation unless their demands were met. Though initially Zia was unmoved, a three-day siege of the Federal Secretariat in Islamabad in July 1980 by approximately 100,000 Shi'a forced him to listen to these demands more attentively, at the very least. The expanding Iranian religious fervor was palpable.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE AFGHAN JIHAD

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan started supporting the Afghan resistance. Within a short time, the "freedom struggle" of Afghans was converted to a "*jihad* project" in order to add religious zeal to the effort and attract fighters from Muslim countries. Western support (especially from the United States and Britain) helped Pakistan in this endeavor. Saudi Arabia, disturbed by the "Shi'a revolution" in Iran, helped to finance the anti-Soviet effort. As a result, the Afghan *mujahidin* received ample funds to wage their ultimately successful guerrilla war against Soviet forces. However, few realized at the time that these religious warriors launched from Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) were staunchly anti-Shi'a. The Saudi-sponsored *madrasa* network played its role in this scenario. For the new religious warriors produced by this network, Shi'a assertiveness was deemed very threatening. Meanwhile, the new clerical regime of Iran, which was indeed interested in expanding their influence in the region, provided financial aid to various Pakistani Shi'a organizations. Hundreds of Pakistani Shi'a traveled to Iran and, benefiting from Iranian scholarships, studied in the theological centers of Qom. These opportunities reinvigorated the self-assertion of Pakistani Shi'a identity.

With the outbreak of a Saudi-Iran proxy war in Pakistan, sectarian conflict intensified. Shi'a leaders and activists increasingly became victims of targeted killings, and in a few cases, Pakistani Shi'a responded in kind. Iranian diplomats in Pakistan also came under attack. The rise in 1985 of Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (the army of the companions of the Prophet, or SSP), a rabidly anti-Shi'a militant group added fuel to the fire. In a tit-for-tat response, Sipah-e Mohammad (the

army of Muhammad), a Shi'a militant group, emerged in the early 1990s. The ascendancy of the Taliban in Afghanistan after 1994 provided a safe haven to anti-Shi'a militants while Islamabad stood idle as the country became engulfed by sectarianism. These groups were finally banned by General Pervez Musharraf in 2001. Experts believe that although Iranian funding for the Shi'a militant group in Pakistan subsided in the late 1990s, Saudi influence in the country through the Wahhabi *madrasa* network is still largely intact. Of late, the Saudi-Iran rivalry in Pakistan is diminishing, but the sectarian confrontation that it generated has become deeply rooted in the process. Being a minority, Pakistani Shi'a remain the more affected group, as is evident from regular attacks (including suicide attacks) on Shi'a religious centers, most recently in Peshawar, Chakwal, Kohat, and FATA's Kurram agency.

CONCLUSION

The Talibanization of FATA and NWFP today is a product of Zia-era domestic and foreign policies and Pakistan's ill-advised and counterproductive support for the Taliban in the 1990s. Support of militant groups in Indian-controlled Kashmir in the 1990s was a natural corollary of the Afghan *jihad*, further complicating India-Pakistan relations. The Islamic Revolution in Iran was a separate development in this scenario, as different social, political, and economic factors were involved in its genesis. However, due to their geographic proximity to Pakistan, the turmoil in Afghanistan and the revolutionary transformation of Iran had a considerable, long-lasting, and largely problematic impact on the country's social, political, and religious dynamics.

Few realized at the time, however, that these religious warriors launched from Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) were staunchly anti-Shi'a.

Sindh's Ethnic Predicament and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Moonis Ahmar

Sindh, the second most populous province after Punjab, is a complex ethnic mosaic. Inter-ethnic tensions in the province, and particularly in its capital city of Karachi, are rising, primarily due to the influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the conflict zones of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Malakand Division of Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) following the recent anti-terrorist military operation. The arrival of these IDPs in Sindh has triggered a widespread nationalist backlash, placing at risk the stability of the province and Pakistan itself.



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Sindh's ethnic predicament has deep and tangled historical roots. The year 1979 is an important landmark in the manner in which this predicament has unfolded. The December 1979 Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan resulted in a massive influx of refugees into Pakistan. Although the bulk of the estimated three million Afghan refugees took shelter in the NWFP and Baluchistan, thousands fled to Karachi. A segment of the refugee population subsequently became involved in drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and other illicit activities. Afghan drug dealers were involved in the Pashtun-Mohajir riots that erupted in the winter of 1987. Moreover, since the majority of Afghan refugees in Karachi were Pashto-speaking, their links to the local Pashtun community caused insecurity among the Urdu-speaking Mohajir and Sindhi communities. The military regime of General Zia ul-Haq promoted Afghan-Pashtun interests in Karachi and Sindh as a whole in order to neutralize the mainstream political parties, particularly in the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP).

The current manifestation of Sindh's ethnic predicament stems from the inflow of IDPs into the province, which has disturbed anew the fragile ethnic balance. Karachi, which has a population of around 15 million, is under serious threat of ethnic upheaval because of decades-old ethnic polarization among four important ethnic groups: Mohajirs (people who migrated from India at the time of partition and settled primarily in Sindh), native Sindhis, Pashtuns, and Punjabis. Pashtuns constitute the second largest ethnic group in Karachi after Mohajirs, followed by Punjabis and Sindhis. Ironically, the Sindhi-speaking population of the city is barely 5%; the rest are Mohajirs, Pashtuns, Punjabis, or Baluchs. There are also illegal migrants in Karachi from Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Afghanistan, and Iran. A sense of insecurity prevails among native Sindhis, many of whom believe that they will become a minority in their own province if the flow of IDPs into the province is not stanchd. The military operation in Malakand division and FATA led to the displacement of three million people. While the majority of

the IDPs are in camps in NWFP, some have crossed into Sindh.

Many of those who oppose the settlement of IDPs in Sindh also believe that, embedded in the midst of these newcomers will be all sorts of miscreants who will play havoc with the lives of innocent people. They argue that Karachi already faces a serious threat from terrorist groups, drug mafias, and other criminal organizations — a threat that will surely worsen in the event that the settlement of IDPs goes unchecked.

Ethnic tensions have boiled over in Sindh on previous occasions. In the early 1970s, riots erupted between Mohajirs and native Sindhis on the language issue, employment, and resources. In the 1980s, ethnic infighting took place, involving Mohajirs, Pashtuns, Mohajirs, and Punjabis.

Today, as in the past, Karachi is a magnet for migrants, refugees, and displaced persons. This is not surprising. After all, Karachi is the provincial capital, the country's largest city, the home to its only viable port, and an industrial and commercial hub that generates 60% of Pakistan's federal revenue. However, the city's transportation, housing, energy, and water infrastructure are severely underfunded. As a result, these services are straining to meet the needs of the population. These basic infrastructural challenges feed into the fragile ethnic mix.

A sense of insecurity prevails among native Sindhis, many of whom believe that they will become a minority in their own province if the flow of IDPs into the province is not stanchied.

Karachi's diversity is evident from the fact that there are more Pashtuns living in this city than in Peshawar, the capital of NWFP. In ethnic terms, Karachi is a microcosm of Pakistan. Despite their history of discord, the Mohajir and Sindhi communities are in agreement that the province cannot bear the burden of a further influx of people from other parts of Pakistan. For the past several years, the leading Mohajir political party, the Muttadha Quami Movement (United National Movement or MQM) has warned of the possible "Talibanization" of Karachi. MQM argues that the influx of IDPs from NWFP and FATA will intensify the threat of religious militancy and terrorism, particularly in the cosmopolitan city of Karachi.

Similarly, organizations representing the Sindhi community have voiced their apprehension about the influx of IDPs into the province, because they regard the province as already over-stretched. They suggest that the IDPs should be settled closer to their original homes. Organizations such as the Sindh Democratic Front, Women Action Forum, and the Sindhi Adabi Sangat have expressed concern that the flow of IDPs into the province is likely to change the demographic ratio and provide cover for terrorists and criminals to operate.

When the military operation was launched in the Malakand Division, particularly in the Swat district, widespread protests and demonstrations against the possible influx and settlement of IDPs occurred in Sindh. The MQM and the Sindhi nationalist forces demanded that either the IDPs should not be allowed to enter Sindh or they should be strictly

confined to camps outside cities. They also demanded the registration of IDPs so that criminal and terrorist elements would be prevented from destabilizing the province.

The Deputy Convener of the MQM Coordination Committee, Dr. Farooq Sattar, demanded that the government make compulsory the registration of all displaced families in Sindh, Baluchistan, and Punjab and restrict the movement of IDPs to their makeshift camps. According to him, “a number of Taliban are also coming to Karachi and other areas in the cover of this migration and they can at any time launch suicide attacks or other acts of terrorism.”

The issue of IDPs also has led to a serious law and order problem in Sindh. The Sindhi nationalist parties, with the support of MQM, called a strike on May 23 to protest against the influx of IDPs. Two people were killed and several injured during the strike.

Ethnicity is a “time tomb” in the ethnically diverse province of Sindh, particularly Karachi. In the battle to gain control of Karachi ... one can expect more violence and bloodshed.

In a show of unity, the Mohajir and Sindhi groups and parties demanded that the government rehabilitate IDPs somewhere near Swat in Mardan or Charsadda, arguing that there was no point in rehabilitating such people 1,000 miles away in Sindh. About 50,000 IDPs arrived in Sindh during the month of May and took shelter either in camps or with their relatives. The Pashtun-dominated Awami National Party (ANP) raised serious concerns over the manner in which the nationalist parties in Sindh were trying to

prevent the influx of IDPs. They accused MQM and Sindhi nationalist parties of not acknowledging the plight of IDPs and of pursuing a very parochial approach to an issue which is no less than a human catastrophe.

Ethnicity is a “time tomb” in the ethnically diverse province of Sindh, particularly Karachi. In the battle to gain control of the country’s financial and industrial hub, one can expect more violence and bloodshed. If the IDP issue is not resolved soon, it will exacerbate inter-ethnic tension. But even if it is, the presence of armed groups in Karachi and their nexus with the drug mafia and the underworld will remain a major destabilizing factor — threatening the peace in this large metropolis while jeopardizing Pakistan’s fragile stability.

Baluchistan: A Hotbed for Insurgency

Syed Farooq Hasnat

Any uneasiness, disturbance, or uprising in Pakistan's Baluchistan province is considered a national security concern with regional and international implications. This strategically important province borders Iran and Afghanistan and has a coastline of 750 kilometers, stretching from Hab (near Karachi) to the port of Gwadar (being built with Chinese assistance) along the Arabian Sea. The westernmost part of Baluchistan is not far from the Strait of Hormuz.¹ The province is rich in minerals; the country's largest natural gas reserve (in Sui) is located there. Baluchistan is also the homeland of the aggressive Bugti tribe.

Baluchistan fits awkwardly into the federation of Pakistan. Although the province constitutes 44% of the country's total land mass, its population of 10 million represents about 5% of country's residents, making the Baluch people the smallest ethnic minority in multiethnic Pakistan. The Baluch, together with their ethnic cousins, the Brahvis, comprise only 47% of the population of Baluchistan. The rest are Pashtuns (46%), Hazaras (Farsi speakers), Sindhis, and Punjabis. But Baluchi tribes stand out as vocal, aggressive, and at times defiant towards the central authority in Islamabad.

Over the years, Pakistan has faced insurgencies by Baluchi groups with secular and jihadist agendas, notably in 1948, 1958, and 1974. The current conflict, which started in 2004, primarily resulted from the highhanded policies of General Pervez Musharraf. This insurgency is secular in nature and bears no similarity to the Taliban insurgency in the country's north. The roots of these numerous revolts date from the period of British rule. The British authorities recognized and supported the institution of *Sardars* (heads of tribes) in an effort to extend their influence. Yet, the tribal revolts that have taken place since independence normally have focused on securing equal rights within the federation. At times, however, Baluch nationalists have sought complete independence from Pakistan — an agenda that has had negative regional repercussions, especially for Iran, where Tehran's relations with the Baluch minority is itself complicated.

Whereas Baluch nationalists have professed national "unity," they have pursued competing objectives and agendas. There is a long history of inter-tribal feuds leading to brutal murders, long-lasting vendettas, arson, and looting. The symbolic importance



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1. The port of Gwadar changed hands in 1783 when it was gifted to Oman by the ruler of Kalat. In 1958, the Pakistani government ultimately purchased it back. As a result, Oman has a sizable Baluchi population working in different fields, including in the Omani armed forces and as palace guards.

of the Baluch language to Baluch national identity and nationalist aspirations suffered a serious setback when the first provincial government adopted Urdu as a provincial language in 1974.²

Pakistan's weak political and federal structures made the Baluch susceptible to various anxieties: from deprivation-driven demand for legitimate constitutional rights to ideologically motivated groups emerging with a leftist ideology and leaning towards the Soviet Union. Lengthy periods of centralized dictatorial military rule kept the Baluch tribes from the decision-making process and hindered their political maturation. *Sardars* have led ordinary Baluchis, most of whom are illiterate and poor, to believe that the policies of the federal government and the province of Punjab are responsible for their misery. However, on the numerous occasions these tribal *Sardars* and *Nawabs* (a title conferred for services rendered to the British Raj) had the chance to govern, but produced little change.

Baluchistan had calmed in the immediate post-Musharraf democratic period, providing hope that its chronic sense of deprivation and frustration was near redress. But this has not been the case. The government has been too slow to act — busy consolidating its strength in all parts of Pakistan, even where it needed to pause and compromise. In recent months, much

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has been said and written about the volatile situation in parts of Baluchistan, but the federal and provincial governments have taken few, if any, steps even to understand the real issues. The killings of three Baluch nationalist leaders in April 2009 added fuel to the fire, triggering protest marches and strikes in the far-flung areas of the province. Protest meetings in solidarity with the slain also were held in Lahore, Islamabad, and Karachi.

The highlight of the current situation was Interior Advisor Rehman Malik's April 23 explanations of the killings and other happenings in Baluchistan at a closed-door Senate session, which was rejected by Baluch Senators. Well known and respected Senator Hasil Bizenjo of the National Party remarked

after the session that the government had not addressed the real issues of Baluchistan and that Malik's allegation of foreign involvement required more evidence.

The troubles in Baluchistan are taking place at a time when Pakistan is threatened by further intrusion of the Taliban into the settled areas of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). Against this background, attending to the problems in Baluchistan is urgently necessary. This requires, first of all, recognizing that a large segment of the Baluch population feels aggrieved, and that a common source of this frustration is the belief that the province receives little attention from the government and a smaller share of resources than are due. It is also important to recognize who actually rules Baluchistan — neither the government nor bureaucrats imported from other provinces, but a team of Baluch tribal *Sardars* and representatives of the people.

2. At that time, the Baluchi language did not have a script. In addition, there are various dialects among the Baluch tribes with Barahvi being a dialect of Dravidian origin. The Baluch population has greater illiteracy than the Baluchistani Pashtuns; therefore, the introduction of the Baluchi language, even if possible, cannot have any meaningful results. In any case, since the Baluch are a minority in the province, they would be unable to enforce their language on the majority.

In the past few months the Zardari government has made several half-hearted attempts to address the convulsions in Pakistan's largest and most strategic province. The government tried to repair the damage inflicted by its predecessor's murder of a Baluch tribal chief, Akbar Bugti, and other "anti-Baluch" policies. President Zardari publicly apologized to the people of the province for past unjust practices and promised to constitute a commission to take stock of the demands of the Baluchi people. On his first visit to Quetta, President Zardari announced a development package of Rs 46.6 billion for the province, and promised more to come.

There is no doubt that Baluchistan should be a top priority of the government, notwithstanding the challenges of confronting militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Swat. The following steps could help improve the dismal situation in Baluchistan and to bring its people into the national mainstream both in socioeconomic and political terms:

- An all-party conference should be convened without delay to discuss all aspects of Baluchistan province. There should be no time limit for the meeting. Every opinion should be heard, especially those from the aggrieved province. The conference must include intellectuals, the media, and other personalities.
- The activities of intelligence agencies should cease immediately. By interfering in domestic affairs, these agencies have done more harm than good to Pakistan.
- The Concurrent List should be removed from the Constitution, forthwith. The province should be given more autonomy as provided under the original 1973 Constitution.
- The Senate should be made a more powerful legislative body, thereby acting on the promise of a true federation.
- The National Finance Commission (NFC) must allocate resources according to the requirements of the provinces. Punjab already has conceded its stance of making population the basis for the distribution of resources.
- Baluchistan needs "freedom" from some of its "anti-development" *Sardars*. The people of the province should be involved in massive developmental projects. In the past these *Sardars* and *Nawabs* usurped Baluch resources, leaving the people poor, illiterate, and frustrated.

In his visit to Quetta, President Zardari remarked: "My government won't hesitate to make constitutional amendments in the light of legislators' recommendations to solve problems of the province." However, little has come of these promises. In any case, the urgency of redress is much slower than the speed of events, violent and otherwise, that are taking place on a daily basis.

Sectarianism in Pakistan: A Profile of Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)

Tahir Kamran

There are a number of general studies of sectarianism in Pakistan,¹ most of which link increased sectarianism with Zia ul-Haq's Islamization, the Afghan War, the proliferation of Deobandi *madrasas*, and the Iranian Revolution. This essay shows how sectarian mobilization intersected with and competed with *biraderi* (patrilineal kinship networks) politics in the district of Jhang, a city in southeastern Punjab. It also situates sectarian militancy within the context of a rising urban commercial class that was locked out of political power by landowners who traditionally dominated district politics. Local traders and bazaar merchants who had wealth but no political clout extended unequivocal support and funding to sectarian Sunni organizations such as Sipah-e Sahaba (SSP) and its offshoot Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LJ).



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Like most militant struggles, the anti-Shi'a campaign of the SSP thrived on bloodshed. Sectarian killing began with the murders of Ehsan Ellahi Zaheer in 1987 and Tehreek Nifaz-e Fiqh Jafariya Pakistan (TNFJ) leader Allama Arif ul-Husseini in 1988. On February 22, 1990, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, the SSP's founder, was killed in a retaliatory bomb attack. Following Haq Nawaz's death, his successors² used the cult of the martyr — around which, ironically, Shi'a theological discourse is structured — to enhance the SSP's electoral standing and its renown. Scores of martyrs and ongoing sectarian strife afforded the SSP "functional utility"³ that contributed immensely to perpetuating its hold.

The SSP's rhetoric always had been aggressive, but following Haq Nawaz's death, its deeds matched its words. In 1996, Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LJ) emerged as an armed offshoot of SSP. Militancy not only intimidated Shi'ites, but also increased the SSP's electoral support. From the outset, the SSP leadership sought influence in the National Assembly

1. Vali Reza Nasr, "The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing role of Islamism and the Ulema in Society and Politics," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2000); Qasim Zaman, "Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shii and Sunni Identities," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 3 (1998); Mohammad Waseem, "Political Sources of Islamic Militancy in Pakistan," in Ian Talbot, ed., *The Deadly Embrace: Religion, Violence and Politics in India and Pakistan 1947-2002* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp.145-163. The Crisis Group Asia Report No. 95 on *The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan* adopts a similar approach.

2. Maulana Zia ur Rehman Faruqi became the Chief Patron of SSP after Haq Nawaz Jhangvi's assassination. Before that he was *Imam* and *Khateeb* of a mosque run by Auqaf Deptt at Sumundri, in District Faisalabad. *Zindagi*, Lahore, March 14-20, 1991.

3. Paul R. Brass, *The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 377.

in order to amend the Constitution and create a Sunnification of the Pakistani state. On that occasion, the government of the Punjab was visibly perplexed about the law and order situation during the period of mourning, as this followed hard on the heels of the murder of Haq Nawaz. As a pre-emptive measure, the government called together urban notables and the leaders of the SSP to negotiate. Malik Saleem Iqbal, the Health Minister of the Punjab, presided over the proceedings. Members of the Jhang District administration, the SSP leadership, and other notables were included in negotiations that led to an *Aman Muahida* (peace treaty).⁴ But only a few days after the accord was reached, a bomb exploded in Jhang, killing three Sunnis and injuring 28. This effectively sabotaged the peace efforts. Indeed, the site of the bomb explosion was not far away from Amanullah Khan Sial's *haveli* (mansion) in Jhang city.⁵ This is highly suggestive that the efforts to bring peace to the conflict-ridden city were stymied because important *biraderis* had been excluded from the process.

The SSP expanded beyond its roots in sectarian rivalries and *biraderi* politics in Jhang. It organized itself remarkably well at the district and *tehsil* level. According to one estimate, by the time that the SSP was outlawed in January 2002, it controlled 74 district- and 225 *tehsil*-level units. In addition, the SSP ran 17 foreign branches, in countries that included Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Canada, and the UK. With its 6,000 trained and professional cadres and 100,000 registered workers,⁶ the SSP was the best organized Islamic party in Pakistan after Jamaat-e Islami.

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The SSP's growing influence was accompanied by an association with violence. While Jhang was the scene of many sectarian killings, they spread to other areas of Punjab and beyond. Although the SSP attempted to distance itself from the activities of its armed offshoot, Lashkar-e Jhangvi, this was never done convincingly. The LJ had links with "international terrorist" movements, which led then-President Pervez Musharraf to ban it and the SSP. The ban merely drove supporters of the SSP and LJ underground.

The Taliban had been a great source of inspiration for SSP leaders, who sought to replicate their policies in Pakistan. In October 2000, Azam Tariq, while speaking at an International Difa-e Sahaba Conference in Karachi, stated that "the SSP aims to transform 28 large Pakistani cities into model Islamic cities where television, cinema and music would be

4. Along with Malik Saleem Iqbal, Arshad Lodhi, the Deputy Commissioner and the Superintendent of Police, the persons who took part in the negotiations were: Maulana Rashid Ahmad Madni, Mohalla Chandanwalla, Dildar Ali (Secretary Anjuman-i-Tajran), Haji Muhammad Ali (President, Anjuman-i-Tajran), Mian Iqbal Hussain, Muhammad Zahur Chuhan Advocate, Sheikh Muhammad Iqbal (Chairman Municipal Committee, Jhang), Muhammad Farooq (President Anjuman-i-Tajran, Jhang City), Muhammad Rafique Saqi (General Secretary Anjuman-i-Tajran Jhang city), Muhammad Aslam (Joint Secretary Anjuman-i-Tajran, Jhang City) and Maulana Esar ul-Qasimi. See, *Aman Muahida (Manzur Shuda) Zilai Intizamia wa membreaan e Committee Anjuman-i-Sipah-i-Sihaba wa Muazizeen-i-Jhang* (Jhang: 1990).

5. Amanullah Khan is a leader of a *sial* clan in Jhang and adheres to the sect.

6. See *Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan*, Terrorist Group of Pakistan, South Asia Terrorism Portal, June 21, 2004, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp?countries/Pakistan/terroristoutfits/ssp.htm>

banned.”⁷ Azam Tariq was an ardent supporter of *jihad* in Indian-controlled Kashmir. When Masud Azhar founded Jaish-e Mohammad in the aftermath of his release in Kandahar, following the hijacking of an Indian aircraft in December 1999, Azam Tariq pledged to send 500,000 *jihadis* to Jammu and Kashmir to fight Indian security forces.⁸

The SSP extremists had two major modes of operation: targeted killings and indiscriminate shootings in places of worship. A number of leading Shi’ites were assassinated. By 1992, the SSP activists had gained access to sophisticated weapons systems. Saudi Arabia was the major source of funding, while Iran provided financial support to Shi’a outfits. In June 1992, SSP adherents used a rocket launcher in an attack that killed five police officers.⁹ The attempted assassination of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in January 1999 is yet another example of the growing scale of SSP attacks.

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During the 1990s, Iranian officials who were serving in various capacities in Pakistan also were victims of SSP militants. Most prominent among them was Agha Sadiq Ganji, the Iranian Consul General, who was gunned down on December 19, 1990.¹⁰ (Although Ganji was widely believed by SSP supporters to have masterminded Haq Nawaz Jhangvi’s murder, there is no tenable evidence of his involvement other than his presence in Jhang that day.) Muhammad Ali Rahimi, an Iranian diplomat, was another victim of a targeted killing in Multan in 1997. The Iranian Cultural Centre at Lahore was set ablaze in January of that year, in retribution for the assassination of Zia ur-Rehman Farooqi along with 26 others at the Lahore Session Court.

Five members of the Iranian armed forces were fatally ambushed in Multan in September, sparking a serious diplomatic row between Islamabad and Tehran.

Sectarian polarization enabled the SSP to increase its vote bank. In the central Jhang constituency in the 1990 election, Maulana Esar ul-Qasimi, Haq Nawaz’s successor and Vice Patron, secured victory with a considerable majority. As the Islami Jamohri Ittehad’s (IJI) candidate for the National Assembly, he obtained 62,486 votes. He also contested a Provincial Assembly seat as an independent candidate, defeating the IJI ticket holder and favorite, Sheikh Iqbal, by the margin of almost 10,000 votes.¹¹

Nawaz Sharif’s crackdown on militancy during 1997-9, together with an atmosphere of the general disapproval of violence and militancy, saw a considerable decline in sectarian killing in Punjab. From January 1999 to December 2000

7. *Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan*, Terrorist Group of Pakistan, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/Pakistan/terroristoutfits/Ssp.htm>

8. “In the Spotlight: *Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan* (SSP),” July 9, 2004, [http://www.cdi.org/.../friendly version/printversion.cfm](http://www.cdi.org/.../friendly%20version/printversion.cfm).

9. *Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan*, Terrorist Group of Pakistan, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/Pakistan/terroristoutfits/Ssp.htm>.

10. *Zindagi*, Lahore, December 14-20, 1991. Sheikh Haq Nawaz was hung in Mianwali on February 28, 2001. Kaka Balli, a relative of Amanullah Sial, was sentenced to life imprisonment for the assassination of Haq Nawaz Jhangvi. *Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan*, Terrorist Group of Pakistan.

11. General Elections Report, p. 243. He contested that election from the JUI (Sami ul-Haq Group) quota. See *Zindagi*, Lahore, March 14-20, 1991.

not a single incident of sectarian violence was reported. The military takeover on October 12, 1999 may be one of the reasons that militant groups had assumed a low profile. However, the 2002 elections, which were held under military rule, reversed the process. Azam Tariq won the election despite being in jail. Although both the LJ and the SSP, along with their Shi'a rivals, the SMP and the TNFJ, had been banned,¹² Azam Tariq was allowed to contest the elections as an independent candidate. This decision evoked a sharp reaction from many quarters. Azam Tariq's victory was quite unexpected, though it fits well into a pattern whereby representatives of religious militant outfits tend to do well in conditions of "guided democracy" because of the marginalization of mainstream parties. However, after 9/11, figures such as Azam Tariq have had to act circumspectly. After securing electoral victory instead of siding with the opposition alliance of religious parties the MMA, Tariq went along with the pro-Musharraf Muslim League (PML-Q) and managed to secure the release of imprisoned SSP activists.

In October 2003, Azam Tariq was killed in Islamabad. There had been 20 previous attempts on his life. Azam Tariq's murder may be the death knell of the SSP or Millat-e Islamiya (the name given to the organization after it was proscribed in 2002). The resulting leadership vacuum has rendered the organization rudderless. Consequently, its immediate future seems bleak. Yet, the nature and scale of violence in post-Saddam Iraq and the role and tenacity of Hizbullah in Lebanon suggest that sectarianism has become a salient feature of the contemporary Middle Eastern and South Asian landscape. The possibility of a "clash within Muslim civilization" cannot be ruled out.

12. See for further detail Ch. Akhter Ali, "Reference under 6(2) of the Political Parties Act (as amended)", Supreme Court of Pakistan, Islamabad, January 29, 2002.

Decades of Disaster: Islamization and the Women of Pakistan

Rubina Saigol

General Zia ul-Haq rode to power on the back of the Nizam-e Mustapha [System of the Prophet] movement led by religious parties against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) government and its alleged rigging in the 1977 elections. Having seized power illegally on the pretext of establishing an Islamic system, General Zia harnessed a conservative and fundamentalist notion of Islam to provide legitimacy to his unconstitutional regime. He relied on the Deobandi Jamaat-e Islami's interpretation of religion to impose his will on the country.



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While all sections of society suffered the impact of so-called Islamization — journalists were flogged, the curricula and textbooks were altered to reflect the values of *jihad*, severe restrictions were placed on the media, and the judicial system was decimated by a parallel Islamic legal system appended to it — women became the main targets of a redefined state which was in the process of repositioning itself in response to the geo-strategic changes in the region. Unable, for various reasons, to enforce Islamic regulation on the banking and economic systems, the state experimented with its retrogressive version of religion on women.

A series of laws that were highly detrimental to the status and position of women in society were passed in order to regulate their behavior and in particular contain and control female sexuality. In 1979 the Hudood Ordinances were promulgated, eliminating the distinction between rape and adultery. The Zina Ordinance (one of five ordinances passed under the Hudood laws) required a woman to produce four adult male Muslim witnesses to prove that she had been raped. Failure to do so would lead to her own conviction for adultery on the grounds that she had confessed to the act of illicit intercourse when she complained of rape! Yet, in the first place, no rapist would commit the crime in the presence of witnesses, and if he did, it could safely be assumed that they were accomplices. It became impossible for women to prove rape or even file a complaint for fear of being prosecuted for adultery. A large number of women from the poor and rural areas were first raped by their employers or landlords and, if they complained, they were thrown into jail on the grounds of fornication or adultery. This travesty of justice was reported in the press around the globe. The enormous outrage finally resulted in a change through the Criminal Laws Amendment Act 2006 when the crime of rape was once again placed within the Pakistan Criminal Procedure Code so that it could be duly investigated and the culprits brought to trial. The state's attempt to write its Islamic credentials on the bodies of women was finally reversed.

The social regulation of women's bodies and morals through legal structures was also accomplished through the Qisas and Diyat Ordinance originally proposed during General Zia's era by the Council for Islamic Ideology, but which was deferred, as it would have prevented the hanging of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. It was passed as an ordinance in 1990 and became an Act of Parliament during Nawaz Sharif's second term in 1997. The major flaw in the Qisas and Diyat law, which covers all offenses against the human body, is that it makes such offenses open to compromise as a private matter between two parties by providing for *Qisas* (retribution) or *Diyat* (blood money). The heirs of the victim can forgive the murderer without receiving any compensation, or *Diyat*, or may compromise after receiving a specified amount. This tribal law in effect privatizes the crime of murder, making it no longer a crime against the state but, instead, a crime against a person. The law has been widely used to allow perpetrators of "honor killings" to go free. Blood relatives (brothers or fathers) can murder a girl on mere suspicion (or for annexing her property) and forgive one another for the crime! The state, instead of being an instrument of the modernization of law, became a tribal entity by capitulating to customary and cultural norms upheld by local patriarchies.

The Zina Ordinance ... required a woman to produce four adult male Muslim witnesses to prove that she had been raped. Failure to do so would lead to her own conviction for adultery

In 1984 the Law of Evidence was passed, effectively reducing the citizenship of women and non-Muslims to second-class status. According to this law, the sworn testimony of two women would be deemed equal to that of one male Muslim in a court of law. The more the state came to define itself in narrowly religious terms, the more it rendered itself an exclusivist state intolerant of difference, diversity, and contestation. Increasing numbers of people became lesser citizens, unequal in the eyes of the law and unable to defend their basic rights and freedoms. The essential pluralism of society was negated in state law and policy which seemed to recognize only male, Sunni, Punjabi citizens, belonging to well-to-do classes, as full citizens. All others — women, non-Muslims, ethnic minorities, and Shi'ites — became lesser citizens with fewer rights and privileges. While some of the inequality was institutionalized through constitutional means, the rest was encouraged through tacit state policy. The state's processes of alienating and "othering" were further exacerbated by its deep involvement in the Afghan war, where competing US and Soviet imperialisms were exploited by the Pakistani military government to shore up its strength.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the subsequent American imperative to drive the USSR out of that country, dovetailed neatly with General Zia's need to deploy Islam as a weapon in the struggle to gain legitimacy. The US encouraged a radical, purist, and uncompromising Wahhabi version of Islam to create the *mujahidin* as a counter to the Soviets. President Jimmy Carter's administration created a secret fund of \$500 million to create terror outfits to fight the Soviets. Nicknamed "Operation Cyclone," this fund was kept secret even from Congress and the American public. Subsequently, the Reagan Administration and Saudi Arabia provided \$3.5 billion to General Zia's regime for the funding of *madrassas* for the Afghan *Jihad*.

Militants were trained in the Brooklyn School in New York and in Virginia by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In Pakistan they were trained by MI6 and Pakistan's Inter-Services-Intelligence (ISI). Religious indoctrination — which fostered the Taliban — was carried out by the Jamiat ul-Ulema-e Islam, a Wahhabi-Deobandi fundamentalist religious-political party based in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). Between 1979 and 1990 there was a mushrooming

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of *madrasas*, *jihad*-related organizations doubled and sectarian outfits increased at the rate of 90%. By 1986 the rate of increase of *deeni madaris* (religious seminaries) was 136% whereas previously it had been a mere 3% annually. By 2002, 7,000 religious institutions were offering higher education degrees. Currently, it is estimated that there are between 18,000 and 22,000 *madrasas* operating in Pakistan, teaching over 1.5 million children. Pakistan is in fact located at the nexus of multiple and competing imperialisms representing the US (and the so-called “West”), Saudi Arabian Wahhabism, and Iranian forms. With massive funds pouring in from Saudi Arabia and

Iran for Sunni and Shi'ite institutions respectively, sectarian clashes and violence intensified in the decades following the imposition of Islamization at gunpoint.

The steady descent into the Taliban's version of an archaic and virulent Islam has had a devastating impact on women. Over at least the past two decades, the Taliban have gained ground in the northern, western, and tribal regions of Pakistan. Tehreek-e Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud is entrenched in Waziristan, whereas Maulana Fazlullah, son-in-law of Sufi Muhammad, founder of the Tehreek-e Nifaz-e Shariat-e Muhammadi (TNSM), is comfortably ensconced in the scenic Swat valley, once a tourist haven in Pakistan. In the last two years the Taliban have burned, torched, and bombed 200 girls' schools in the Malakand Division and have ordered an end to the education of women. They have threatened to mete out dire punishments to women who work for a living, and have strictly forbidden them from going to the market to buy essential needs. The Taliban have prohibited barbers from shaving men's beards and have either destroyed or forced shut music and DVD shops. Musicians and barbers have been forced out of the area at gunpoint. The video of a 17-year-old girl being flogged publicly by the Taliban for alleged immoral activity is representative of the kinds of medieval punishments that the Taliban's distorted notion of justice imposes on the hapless people of an area that was once under governmental writ.

What began as the reconstitution of state policy in 1979 in response to global imperial pressures and the military's need to entrench itself in government, has become a nightmare in 2009. The Nizam-e Adl agreement concluded recently between the TNSM's Sufi Muhammad and the ANP government of NWFP essentially cedes sovereignty to the Taliban and acknowledges the end of the writ of state. As the state disintegrates through a policy of appeasement, women — already diminished citizens — are left at the mercy of the inhuman Taliban.

Women's Rights in Pakistan

Anita M. Weiss

Two momentous events occurred in Pakistan in 1979 that continue to have implications for women's rights: the promulgation of Zia ul-Haq's Islamization program (including the Hudood Ordinance)¹ and the creation of the Women's Division (precursor to the Ministry for Women's Development) in response to international pressure during the United Nations Decade for Women (1975-85). These two actions provoked contradictory political enterprises, namely those which demand that the state incorporate more laws and institutions derived from or at least associated with Islam, and those which demand the rights of women along the lines of those advocated within the global community.

The Islamist coalition, the Muttahida Majlis-e Amal (MMA) came to head the opposition at the federal level and formed a government in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) after the October 2003 elections and Pakistan witnessed the rise of extremist, militant Islamist groups in the areas bordering Afghanistan. Since that time, the debates over the roles and rights of women and the role Islam (and which interpretation of Islam) should play in society has intensified. Most, albeit not all, members of these Islamist groups embrace views about women that they understand to be derived from Islam, and which place women in a subservient, perhaps even subjugated role. The other side of the debate comprises myriad voices — the state, civil society groups, women, external donor agencies — all of whom profess to promote the empowerment of women, eliminate discrimination, and enhance women's access to opportunities. Within each constituency, there are deep divides as well.

Though 97% of its population is Muslim, Pakistan is still searching for an appropriate role for Islam in civic and political life. To many, being a Muslim is intrinsically tied to local cultural practices which they regard as inextricably intertwined with faith. There is a great deal of confusion over where the lines should be drawn between what is Islamic, what is codified tradition, and how (if at all) to delineate their separate jurisdictions. Consensus remains particularly elusive in identifying what constitutes women's rights. In spite of this scenario, there have been some noteworthy developments in the advancement of women's rights over the past decade, including the restoration of reserved parliamentary seats for women, reform of the Hudood Ordinance which resulted in the

1. The Hudood Ordinance, enacted in 1979 as part of General Zia ul-Haq's Islamization program, was aimed at imposing *Shari'a* law by implementing punishments mentioned in the Qur'an and *sunna* for *zina* (extramarital sex), *qazf* (false accusation of *zina*), the consumption of alcohol, and theft.



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Protection of Women Act 2006 and other legislation under consideration now by Parliament, and acceptance of Pakistan's CEDAW Report by the United Nations in May 2007.²

Nevertheless, achieving a Pakistani consensus on defining women's rights remains elusive, as exemplified by the struggle to ensure the right of female education. Those who promote female education argue that it is indispensable to advancing women's rights in their entirety. Yet, to accomplish this, there must be an adequate number of schools where girls are taught useful skills and all students are taught about women's rights. Indeed, there is no consensus that substantive female education in schools that teach more than *Islamiyat* is valuable for Pakistan's future as well as for the future of the individual girls. This consensus is lacking not only in Swat and elsewhere in northwestern Pakistan, where some militant Islamist extremists have decreed all girls schools should be shuttered, but also in many homes throughout the country, especially in rural areas. It is therefore not surprising that less than half of all women in Pakistan over age ten are literate; these numbers are appreciably lower in the western parts of the country. Fewer than 6% of all children who enroll in primary education make it to secondary school (ninth grade).³

The challenge of ensuring only one specific right — female education — displays the need for a consensus that women in Pakistan have a right, to paraphrase Fatima Mernissi, to design a future for themselves instead of just growing old.⁴ Sometimes this may mean that ensuring rights we presume Pakistani women are accorded because they are consistent with Islamic *Shari'a* — such as retaining inherited land or divorcing abusive husbands — are actually enjoyed, or that new rights need to be enshrined to rectify abuses which have existed in traditional society, such as outlawing *swara*, *karo-kari*⁵ and other practices which cause women to bear the consequences for wrongs committed by others.

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Pakistan reached a crossroads in November 2006 when two of the most controversial parts of the Hudood Ordinance were reformed, which placed the crimes of rape and adultery back into the Penal Code. This was the culmination of women's rights activism that had begun shortly after Zia's promulgation of the Islamization program in 1979. The reform was finally set in motion when Pakistan became a States Party to the United Nations CEDAW Convention in 1996 and, as such, pledged to the global community that it would review existing laws and social institutions to eliminate discrimination against women. Little was done in this regard until Pervez Musharraf's government revived the issue of women's empowerment early in

2. CEDAW is the United Nations' Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, to which Pakistan became a States Party in 1996.

3. Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Education, Table 5, "Pakistan Education Statistics 2005-06."

4. Fatima Mernissi, *The Veil and the Male Elite: a Feminist Interpretation of Women's Rights in Islam*, trans., Mary Jo Lakeland (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1991).

5. *Swara* is a custom in tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan whereby a young girl is forcibly married to a member of a different clan to resolve a feud. *Karo-kari* is a custom whereby an individual can kill another, claiming that he/she has brought dishonor to the family.

this decade as a key component of its policies to promote Pakistan's progress. It established distinct quotas to promote women's greater participation in public arenas of society: 5% for women in government service (now 10%), 17% for women in the national and provincial parliaments, and 33% for women in most tiers of local government. It formalized the National Commission on the Status of Women, sought national consensus on a National Policy on Women, and set in motion a series of reforms to promote women's rights consistent with globalized norms articulated in the CEDAW Convention. Parliament is now considering a national domestic violence act that will afford protection against physical, emotional, sexual, verbal, and economic abuse not only to women but also to children and other vulnerable persons. A second bill under consideration, concerning sexual harassment, proposes amendments to expand the ambit of the Pakistan Penal Code to cover manifestations of harassment at the workplace.

However, these legal reforms are clearly counter to what the majority of Islamist political groups argue is necessary to secure women's rights. Many would argue that studying the Qur'an and the *sunna* and following the dictates of Islam more closely is valuable for women, and that anything more may expose them to ideas that are *shirk* (unacceptable beliefs) and be disruptive for households and the wider community. In interviews I conducted in 2008 in Islamabad at the al-Huda Centre, which provides female education to women consistent with ideas that political Islamist groups would support, its staff were quite clear about their views on protecting women's rights, which include the right to love as a daughter and a wife, the right of inheritance, and the right to learn (to gain knowledge), which, as laid out in the *hadith*, is the obligation of every Muslim. Hence, these various groups emphasize the reinforcing of traditional norms of propriety and female subservience over debating women's other rights.

These debates draw the Pakistan state further into the discourse of defining women's rights through the institutional structures it promotes. An example is seen in its consideration of the role of the *wali*, or guardian. The Criminal Law Amendment Act (1997) lays out the method for distribution of *qisas* and *diyat* (blood money) in the event of a murder. While the *wali* is defined in gender-neutral terms, in both language and practice the *wali* is always a male. For the state to contend that the *wali* need not be a man would be to invalidate longstanding local patriarchal interpretations of men's responsibilities and would likely result in further opposition to the writ of the state.

What is happening in Swat and other Taliban-controlled areas not only threatens to undermine state policies concerned with eliminating discrimination against women as well as the small gains made thus far in empowering women, but is serving to polarize the country. The Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan⁶ are exerting pressure on the Government of Pakistan to compromise on women's rights in return for political accommodations. In these circumstances, there are few people who are able to champion the cause of women's rights and pressure the federal government not to capitulate to Taliban demands; even the position of head of the Ministry for Women's Development is currently vacant.

[T]here are few people who are able to champion the cause of women's rights and pressure the federal government not to capitulate to Taliban demands ...


6. I am using this term to include the whole gamut of Islamist political groups which have taken up arms against the Government of Pakistan in FATA and NWFP in recent years.

To the Government of Pakistan's credit, it has finally decided to act against those who seek to impose an extremist view of Islam's vision of women's rights in the country. Hopefully, the military action will create an environment in which the advocates of the two contradictory political enterprises — those prioritizing global rights for women and those advocating a closer adherence to Islamic precepts — can reach an accommodation. As Pakistan's Planning Commission concludes in a recent report, "without the empowerment and emancipation of women, the country will not achieve its Vision for 2030." The realization of that vision — of a healthy, prosperous, and viable future for the country as a whole — rests in no small part on forging a national consensus on what constitutes the rights of women.


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



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

Kashmir Region









Statistics



Demographics






Statistics from UN Stats.










Economy







Exchange Rate, at Current Prices





Per Capita Gross National Product





Youth Unemployment Rate (Age 15-24)




Education, Gender, and Technology



Education, Gender, and Technology





From the pages of *The Middle East Journal's* “Chronology:” Pakistan in 1979

Since it began publication in 1947, each issue of *The Middle East Journal* has contained a section chronologically detailing events of note in the region for the preceding three months. Today, this section is dubbed the “Chronology,” although in the earliest issues of the *Journal*, it was called “Developments of the Quarter.” The Chronology is organized by country and issue, with each section providing a day-by-day account of the relevant events and developments. Mirroring the *Journal*, the Chronology’s coverage of the region spans from North Africa in the west to formerly Soviet Central Asia, to Pakistan in the east.

Given the longevity of *The Middle East Journal*, the Chronology is an indispensable resource to those interested in the politics and history of the modern Middle East — in the pages of the *Journal*, readers can essentially read a daily accounting of the events in a particular country from 1947 through today. Entries for the Chronology are written as they occur and represent a real-time window not only into the events of the region, but into the overall context of the time and place in which they occurred.

The following pages contain reproductions of the Chronology entries written for Pakistan during 1979. They provide a unique and detailed look into a series of events that have left an indelible mark upon the region.

Oman

(See also, Bahrayn, Yemen)

1978

Dec. 11: Yemeni President 'Alī 'Abdallāh Šālīh arrived in Muscat and met with Sultan Qābūs bin Sa'īd. [FBIS]

Dec. 19: Kuwayti Crown Prince Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallāh Āl Šabāh was in Muscat for talks on "consolidating bilateral relations." [MEED]

1979

Feb. 4: Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Qays al-Zawāwī met Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Sa'ūd al-Fayṣal in Saudi Arabia and then returned to Oman. [AN]

Pakistan

(See also, Afghanistan, Iran, United Arab Emirates)

1978

Nov. 18: A court ordered the government to release Nusrat Bhutto, wife of former President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, from house arrest. [NYT]

Dec. 15: Commerce Minister Mian Zahid Sarfraz returned to Rawalpindi at the end of a visit to Kabul. A communiqué said that Pakistan and Afghanistan had agreed in principle to set up a joint ministerial commission on bilateral trade. [FBIS]

Dec. 17: *The New York Times* reported that the government had lifted censorship imposed 2 months earlier on 8 periodicals in Sind province. [NYT]

Dec. 18: Former Premier Bhutto appeared before the Supreme Court to appeal against his conviction on murder charges. [FBIS]

Bhutto said he was being "persecuted" in his jail treatment and appealed for justice to the Supreme Court. [NYT]

Dec. 21: Bangladesh Foreign Minister Mohammad Shamsul Haq met with President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq in Pakistan. [FBIS]

1979

Jan. 22: Chinese Deputy Premier Li Hsien-nien pledged China's support of Pakistan against any "foreign aggression" and said China "firmly supports" Pakistani demands for "self-determination" in Kashmir. [NYT]

Jan. 25: Malaysian Premier Datuk Hussein Bin Onn arrived in Islamabad on a 4 day official visit. [FBIS]

Jan. 29: UAA President Zāyid bin Sulṭān Āl Nuḥayyān met with President Zia-ul-Haq in Pakistan. [FBIS]

Feb. 3: Police arrested supporters of Bhutto in a nationwide sweep. [WP]

Feb. 6: The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Bhutto by a vote of 4 to 3. [NYT]

The US State Department said that President Jimmy Carter had asked Pakistan to spare the life of Bhutto. [NYT]

Feb. 9: Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev and Pope John Paul II appealed to Pakistan to spare the life of Bhutto. [NYT]

Feb. 10: New penal measures based on Islamic principles of justice went into force. [AN]

Feb. 11: Chinese Premier Hua Kuo-feng appealed to Pakistan to grant clemency to Bhutto. [NYT]

Feb. 13: Lawyers for Bhutto filed a request for a stay of execution. [NYT]

Feb. 14: The Supreme Court granted a 10 day stay of execution in order to consider a request to reconsider its decision concerning Bhutto. [NYT]

Qatar

(See also, Saudi Arabia)

1978

Dec. 12: Kuwayti Crown Prince Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallāh Āl Šabāh ended a visit to Doha during which he had held talks with Amir Shaykh Khalīfah bin Ḥamad Āl Thānī. [FBIS]

Dec. 17: Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko arrived in Doha and met with Amir Shaykh Khalīfah. [FBIS]

Dec. 24: The following were appointed to the Cabinet: Shaykh Muḥammad bin Ḥamad Āl Thānī: *Education*; Shaykh Aḥmad bin Sayf Āl Thānī: *State for Foreign Affairs*. [FBIS]

1979

Jan. 30: Amir Shaykh Khalīfah returned to Qatar at the end of a month long private visit to Europe. [MEED]

Feb. 13: UAA Petroleum Minister Māna' Sa'īd al-'Uṭaybah met with Amir Shaykh Khalīfah and Finance Minister Shaykh 'Abd al-'Azīz bin Khalīfah Āl Thānī in Doha. [FBIS]

Saudi Arabia

(See also, Arab Israeli Conflict, Petroleum Affairs, Bahrayn, Lebanon, Oman, Sudan, Yemen)

1978

Nov. 17: US Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal arrived in Jiddah on a 2 day official visit. [FBIS]

Arsalan al-Jadidi: *Work & Vocational Training*
 Abdelhafiz Kadiri: *Youth & Sports*
 Abdallah Gharnit: *Social Affairs and Traditional Industries*

Abbas al-Fassi: *Housing & Territorial Management*
 Benali Mansouri: *Administrative Affairs*
 Mohand Nacer: *Transport*
 Rahhal Rahhali: *Health*

Moussa Saadi: *Energy & Minerals*
 Azzeddine Jassous: *Commerce & Industry*
 Abdelsalem Znined: *Tourism*
 Abdelwahid Belakziz: *Information*
 Abdellatif Jouhari: *Minister Delegate to the Parliament*
 Abbas Kissi: *Secretary General to the Government* [FBIS]

March 27: The National Defense Council was formed: Ahmad Osman, Dey Ould Sidi Baba, Hachmi Filali, Abdelkarim Ghallab, Abdelrahman Bouabid, Abdelwahad Radi, Mohammad Haddou Abarkach, Mohammad Khattabi, Ali Yara and Achour Bekkay. [MEED]

April 12: Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko arrived in Rabat for talks with Moroccan leaders. [FBIS]
 French Foreign Minister Jean-François Poncet arrived in Morocco for talks. [FBIS]

April 15: Jordanian King Husayn arrived in Rabat for a private visit and talks with King Hasan on the Middle East situation. [NYT]

May 3: Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Fahd met with King Hasan in Morocco. [FBIS]

Mauritanian Premier Ahmed Ould Bouceif said Mauritania was willing to start talks with the Polisario Front concerning Western Sahara. [NYT]

May 5: Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo and Malian President Moussa Traore met with King Hasan in Fez. [FBIS]

May 8: The Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference opened in Fez. [AN]

Oman

(See also, Arab Israeli Conflict, Petroleum Affairs, Bahrain)

1979

Feb. 28: British Queen Elizabeth II arrived in Muscat on the last leg of a tour of Gulf states. [AN]

March 2: British Queen Elizabeth II ended a visit to Oman. [AN]

April 9: Egyptian Vice President Husnī Mubārak met with Sultan Qābūs bin Sa'īd. [FBIS]

April 22: The first Ambassador from the People's Republic of China arrived in Muscat. [FBIS]

April 25: Egyptian Vice President Mubārak arrived in Muscat and met with Sultan Qābūs. [FBIS]

May 8: Sultan Qābūs said there were no Egyptian troops in the Sultanate and there was no intention to invite any such troops to Oman. [FBIS]

Pakistan

(See also, Arab Israeli Conflict, Afghanistan, Iran)

1979

Feb. 22: The *Christian Science Monitor* reported that 6 foreign correspondents had been charged with contempt for writing about the Supreme Court decision upholding the death sentence against former President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. [CSM]

Feb. 25: The Supreme Court gave government officials 4 weeks to say why they should not be held guilty of contempt for publishing accusations against former President Bhutto while he was appealing a death sentence. [NYT]

March 12: Pakistan withdrew from the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). [NYT]

March 24: The Supreme Court dismissed a petition on behalf of Bhutto asking that the rejection of his appeal be reconsidered. [NYT]

March 25: Prison officials served Bhutto a warrant notifying him that the death sentence would be carried out within 7 days. [NYT]

March 26: Prison officials removed all comforts, including the bed, from Bhutto's jail cell, and cut off his electricity. [NYT]

March 27: Pakistan signed an agreement with France to buy 32 Mirage jet interceptors. [NYT]

March 29: The High Court of Sind rejected a petition on behalf of Bhutto challenging the legality of constitutional changes introduced under martial law. [NYT]

March 31: The Pakistani People's Party filed an appeal to President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq to spare Bhutto's life. [NYT]

April 1: It was disclosed that a half sister of Bhutto had appealed on his behalf against his wishes for clemency. [NYT]

April 3: Police in Sind Province said raids on 3 houses owned by Bhutto had recovered "secret documents of an extremely sensitive nature." [NYT]

April 4: Bhutto and 4 other men were executed in Rawalpindi. [NYT]

April 5: Demonstrations against the executions took place in Rawalpindi, Lahore, Karachi and other cities. Hundreds of arrests were made. [NYT]

April 6: The US cut off economic and military assistance to Pakistan after it concluded that Pakistan was building a plant to produce weapons-grade enriched uranium. [NYT]

April 7: Demonstrations against the executions were held. In some cities anti-Bhutto demonstrators clashed with his supporters. [NYT]

April 8: The government denied that it was trying to develop nuclear weapons. [NYT]

April 15: The Pakistan National Alliance withdrew from the government, saying its objectives had been achieved. [NYT]

April 21: A new Cabinet was sworn in:

Mir Ali Ahmed Talpur: *Defense*

Faiez Ali Chisti: *Labor & Manpower, Petroleum and Northern Areas & Kashmir Affairs*

Inamul Haq: *Housing & Works, Water & Power*

Ghulam Hassan Khan: *Production & Industries*

Ghulam Ishaq Khan: *Finance, Deputy Chairman of Planning Commission and Provincial Coordinator & Commissioner*

Muhammad Ali Khan: *Education*

Fazil Janjua: *Food, Agriculture and Coöperatives*

Mahmud Haroon: *Interior, Religious Affairs and Minority Affairs*

Jamal Syed Mian: *Railways and Local Government & Rural Development*

Sharifuddin Pirzada: *Attorney General, Law & Parliamentary Affairs*

Mohyuddin Baluch: *Communications*

Javed Hashmi: *Culture & Tourism*

Shamid Hamed: *Information & Broadcasting*

Hamid Habib: *State for Export Development*

Mahmud Ali: *State for National Council of Social Affairs*

Agha Shahi: *Adviser for Foreign Affairs*

M. Afzal: *Adviser for Higher Education*

Muazzam Ali: *Adviser for Overseas Pakistani Affairs*

Hakim Mohammad Syed: *Health*

Begum Waqarun Nisa Noon: *Chairman of Pakistan Tourism Development Corporation* [FBIS]

Qatar

(See also, Arab Israeli Conflict)

1979

Feb. 21: British Queen Elizabeth II arrived in Qatar and was met by Amir Shaykh Khalifah bin Hamad Āl Thāni. [AN]

March 1: Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yāsir 'Arafāt arrived in Doha and met with Amir Shaykh Khalifah. [FBIS]

March 14: A Jordanian airliner crashed in Qatar during a thunderstorm, killing 45 people. [NYT]

April 9: Lebanese Premier Salim al-Ḥuṣṣ met with Amir Shaykh Khalifah in Doha. [FBIS]

April 23: Turkish Foreign Minister Gündüz Öküzün arrived in Doha on a 2 day visit to Qatar. [FBIS]

May 3: Qatar announced a revaluation of the riyal by 2% as of May 15. [FBIS]

May 11: *Middle East Economic Digest* reported that the UAA and Bahrain had suspended their currency exchange arrangements with Qatar following the Qatari revaluation. [MEED]

Saudi Arabia

(See also, Arab Israeli Conflict, Petroleum Affairs, Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco)

1979

Feb. 24: South Yemeni Foreign Minister Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ Muṭī' arrived in Riyadh, met with Foreign Minister Sa'ūd al-Fayṣal, and returned to South Yemen. [FBIS]

Feb. 26: Greek Premier Constantine Karamanlis met with Crown Prince Fahd and other Saudi officials in Saudi Arabia. [FBIS]

Feb. 28: Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yāsir 'Arafāt met with King Khālīd in Saudi Arabia. [FBIS]

March 4: Saudi Arabian delegate to the UN Jamīl Murād Bārūdī died, aged 73. [NYT]

March 10: Guinean President Sekou Touré met with King Khālīd in Jiddah. [FBIS]

March 21: Jordanian King Ḥusayn began a 2 day visit to Saudi Arabia for talks with King Khālīd on the Middle East situation. [FBIS]

March 25: It was announced that Crown Prince Fahd had arrived in Spain and been admitted to a hospital for a medical examination. [FBIS]

April 1: Lebanese Premier Salim al-Ḥuṣṣ arrived in Riyadh on a visit. [FBIS]

April 29: *The New York Times* quoted Prince 'Abdallāh as saying that all Saudi leaders were "united in opinion, spirit, objective and perspective." [NYT]

May 12: Yemeni President 'Alī 'Abdallāh Ṣāliḥ arrived in Riyadh and met with King Khālīd. [FBIS]

May 13: Crown Prince Fahd met with French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in Paris. [AN]

May 14: Crown Prince Fahd met with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in Bonn. [AN]

South Yemen

(See also, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen)

1979

March 30: Chairman of the Presidium 'Abd al-Fattāḥ Ismā'īl returned to Aden from a summit conference in Kuwait. [FBIS]

April 7: Foreign Minister Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ Muṭī' left South Yemen for Addis Ababa and met with Ethiopian Head of State Mengistu Haile Mariam. [FBIS]

April 13: Premier 'Alī Nāṣir Muḥammad left Damascus for Bulgaria at the end of a 1 day visit to Syria. [FBIS]

'Alī al-Khalīl: *Finance*
 Nāzīm al-Qādirī: *Labor & Social Affairs*
 Butrus Harb: *National Education & Fine Arts, Public Works and Transport*

Talāl al-Mir'ibi: *Economy, Trade & Public Health*

Yūsuf Jubrān: *Justice & Information* [MEED]

July 30: Syrian troops battled Christian militia forces with mortars and rockets in Beirut. [NYT]

Aug. 6: Minister of State Hilū resigned his post. [AN]

Aug. 9: The Cabinet won a vote of confidence in the Parliament by a vote of 54 to 9. [NYT]

Aug. 13: Gunmen in Beirut wounded the Iraqi Ambassador and 2 other people. [NYT]

Libya

(See also, Arab Israeli Conflict, Petroleum Affairs, Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen)

1979

May 23: South Yemeni Chairman of the Presidium 'Abd al-Fattāh Ismā'īl arrived in Tripoli and met with Head of State Mu'ammār al-Qadhafī. [FBIS]

May 31: Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito arrived in Tripoli and was met by Head of State Qadhafī. [FBIS]

June 7: Yemeni Premier 'Abd al-'Azīz 'Abd al-Ghanī arrived in Tripoli. [FBIS]

June 10: The West German periodical *Der Spiegel* said former Ugandan President Idi Amin was living near Tripoli in a government guest house. [NYT]

June 20: West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher left Tripoli at the end of a 2 day visit to Libya. [FBIS]

July 12: Qadhafī arrived in Benghazi at the end of a tour of 10 Arab states. [FBIS]

July 21: Turkish Minister of National Defense Neşet Akmandor arrived in Tripoli on a 3 day visit. [FBIS]

July 26: Chadian Interior Minister of the Provisional Government Goukouni Oueddei said Chadian troops had defeated a Libyan invasion force in June in a series of battles in north Chad. [NYT]

July 31: Guinean President Ahmed Sekou Touré met with Qadhafī in Libya. [FBIS]

Morocco

1979

May 19: Saudi Arabian King Khālid arrived in Meknes on a state visit. [FBIS]

June 13: Forces of the Polisario Front attacked the Moroccan town of Tan Tan. [AN]

June 15: Spanish King Juan Carlos met with King Hasan in Fes. [FBIS]

July 19: The Organization of African Unity called for a

UN supervised referendum in Western Sahara and urged that a ceasefire go into effect there. [NYT]

Aug. 5: Mauritania signed an agreement with the Polisario Front in Algiers under which Mauritania renounced all claim to the southern part of Western Sahara. [NYT]

Aug. 9: Morocco rejected the peace agreement between Mauritania and the Polisario Front and ordered Moroccan troops to leave Mauritania. [NYT]

Aug. 10: Mauritanian Premier Mohamed Khouna Ould Heydalla arrived in Rabat and met with King Hasan. [FBIS]

Aug. 12: *Arab News* reported that a Moroccan delegation headed by Interior Minister Driss Basri had visited the coastal town of Dakhla in the former Mauritanian sector of Western Sahara. [AN]

Aug. 14: The Polisario Front said it would push attacks in Moroccan territory "as far and as hard as possible." [NYT]

Oman

(See also, Petroleum Affairs)

1979

May 22: The *Gulf News Agency* reported that the following Cabinet changes had been made:

Fahar bin Taymūr Āl Bū Sa'id: *Deputy Premier for Security & Defense Affairs*

Fahd bin Maḥmūd Āl Bū Sa'id: *Deputy Premier for Legal Affairs*

Fayṣal bin 'Alī Āl Bū Sa'id: *National Heritage & Culture*
 Aḥmad 'Abdallāh al-Ghazālī: *Land and Municipalities Affairs*

'Aṣīm al-Jamālī: *Environment Affairs*

Sa'id Aḥmad al-Shanfari: *Petroleum & Minerals*

'Abd al-Ḥāfiẓ Sālim: *Agriculture & Fisheries*

Yahyā Maḥfūẓ al-Mundhurī: *Education*

Badr bin Su'ūd Āl Bū Sa'id: *Interior*

'Abd al-'Azīz al-Rawwās: *Information and Youth Affairs*. [FBIS]

June 1: Minister of State and Wali of Dhufar Province Burayk bin Ḥamūd al-Ghāfirī died, aged 46. [MEED]

June 28: A delegation headed by Foreign Ministry Under Secretary Yūsuf al-'Alawī returned to Muscat from Tehran at the end of a 3 day visit. [FBIS]

July 18: Yemeni Political Advisor to the President 'Abdallāh al-Aṣṇaj arrived in Muscat for talks with Omani leaders. [FBIS]

Pakistan

(See also, Afghanistan, Iraq)

1979

May 17: Foreign Affairs Advisor Agha Shahi left Karachi for a 2 day visit to the People's Republic of China. [FBIS]

- May 22: The government released from confinement former Commander of the Army Tikka Khan and 4 other officials of the Pakistan People's Party. [NYT]
 May 25: Begum Nusrat Bhutto, widow of former Premier Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was elected President of the Pakistan People's Party. [FBIS]
 May 28: Nusrat Bhutto and her daughter Benazir were released from detention near Islamabad and flown to Karachi. [NYT]
 July 1: Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister Shah Mohammad Dost arrived in Islamabad on a 2 day visit. [FBIS]
 July 8: Opponents of government budget policy staged a 1 day strike in Karachi. [NYT]
 July 24: Four men convicted with former Premier Bhutto of a political murder were hanged. [AN]

Qatar

(See also, Petroleum Affairs, Saudi Arabia)

1979

- July 2: Libyan Head of State Mu'ammār al-Qadhafī arrived in Doha for talks with Qatari leaders. [FBIS]
 July 8: Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre arrived in Doha for talks. [FBIS]

Saudi Arabia

(See also, Petroleum Affairs, Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco, United Arab Emirates, Yemen)

1979

- June 5: Yemeni Premier 'Abd al-'Azīz 'Abd al-Ghanī arrived in Riyadh and met with King Khālid. [FBIS]
 June 24: Mauritanian President Mohamed Mahmud Louly arrived in Saudi Arabia on an official visit. [FBIS]
 West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher left Jiddah at the end of a 2 day visit. [FBIS]
 June 26: Kuwayti Amir Shaykh Jābir al-Aḥmad Āl Šabāh left Saudi Arabia at the end of a 1 day visit to the Kingdom. [FBIS]
 Qatari Amir Shaykh Khalīfah bin Ḥamad Āl Thānī arrived in Saudi Arabia and was met by King Khālid. [FBIS]
 July 1: Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre arrived in Riyadh for talks with Saudi leaders. [FBIS]
 July 4: Libyan Head of State Mu'ammār al-Qadhafī arrived in Riyadh and was met by King Khālid. [FBIS]
 July 13: Japanese Minister of International Trade Masumi Esaki arrived in Saudi Arabia for talks with Saudi leaders. [FBIS]
 July 14: Maltese Premier Dom Mintoff arrived in Jiddah on an official visit. [FBIS]
 July 16: French Defense Minister Yvon Bourges met with King Khālid in al-Ṭā'if. [FBIS]

- July 17: Jordanian King Ḥusayn met with King Khālid in al-Ṭā'if. [FBIS]

South Yemen

(See also, Algeria, Libya)

1979

- June 3: An Iraqi university professor teaching at Aden University was murdered at his home. It was reported that 2 Iraqis had been seen leaving the scene in a car with diplomatic plates. [MEED]
 June 4: Troops surrounded the Iraqi Embassy. [MEED]
 June 5: Troops stormed the Iraqi Embassy and took 5 Iraqis into custody. [MEED]
 June 12: *The Iraqi News Agency* cited an Iraqi Foreign Ministry spokesman as announcing the withdrawal of its Ambassador from Aden. [FBIS]
 June 27: Minister of Fish Resources Muḥammad Sālīm 'Akkūsh was relieved of his post. [FBIS]
 July 9: Libyan Head of State Mu'ammār al-Qadhafī arrived in Aden and was met by Chairman of the Presidium 'Abd al-Fattāḥ Ismā'īl. [FBIS]
 July 13: *Aden Domestic Service* reported that Chairman of the Council of Ministers 'Alī Nāṣir Muḥammad had returned to Aden at the end of a visit to the Soviet Union. [FBIS]
 Aug. 5: *The New York Times* cited "Navy intelligence sources" as saying a Soviet nuclear submarine and a tender had entered the port of Yemen. [NYT]
 Aug. 11: The Supreme People's Council met in extraordinary session. It elected Muḥammad 'Awaḍ al-Sa'dī and Ṭaha 'Alī Šālīḥ as members of the Presidium in place of Faḍīl Muḥsin 'Abdallāh and Maḥmūd Sa'īd Madhī. [FBIS]
 The following were elected as members of the Council of Ministers:
 Anīs Ḥasan Yahyā: *Fish Resources*
 Sālīm Šālīḥ Muḥammad: *Foreign Affairs*
 'Alī Shayī Hādī: *Interior*
 Faḍīl Muḥsin 'Abdallāh: *Agriculture & Agrarian Reform*
 Maḥmūd Sa'īd Madhī: *Finance*
 Faraj bin Ghānim: *Planning* [FBIS]

Sudan

1979

- May 19: A trial of 45 defendants accused of political crimes began in a Khartoum suburb. [FBIS]
 May 23: French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing arrived in Khartoum for talks with Sudanese leaders. [FBIS]
 May 28: The following Cabinet appointments were made:
 'Abd al-Mājid Khalīl: *Defense*

- Aug. 25: Polisario Front guerrillas said they had attacked the southern Moroccan garrison town of Lebuirate the day before. [NYT]
- Sept. 1: Egyptian President Anwar al-Sādāt said he had received a request for military aid from King Hasan II and that he had acceded to the request. [AN]
- Sept. 2: Saudi Arabian Second Deputy Premier Prince 'Abdallāh arrived in Fez on a private visit to Morocco. [AN]
- Sept. 13: UAA President Shaykh Zāyid bin Sulṭān Āl Nuḥayyān arrived in Rabat from Switzerland on a private visit to Morocco. [FBIS]
- Sept. 16: Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yāsir 'Arafāt arrived in Morocco for talks with Moroccan leaders. The Moroccan news agency reported that the visit came "within the framework of the mediation" by the PLO between Algeria and Morocco concerning Western Sahara. [NYT]
- Sept. 27: Premier Maata Bouabid returned to Fez at the end of a visit to Senegal. [FBIS]
- Oct. 7: Moroccan troops and Polisario guerrillas battled at the Western Sahara town of Smara. Results of the battle were disputed. [MEED]
- Oct. 10: The Moroccan newspaper *al-Maghrib* said that an attack on the Western Sahara town of Smara the past weekend was "quite obviously an attack by the regular Algerian army against national Moroccan territory." [AN]
- Oct. 22: *The New York Times* reported that US President Jimmy Carter had decided to seek Congressional approval for the sale of reconnaissance planes and helicopter gunships to Morocco. [NYT]
- Oct. 28: Senegalese President Leopold Senghor arrived in Rabat for talks with King Hasan. [FBIS]
- Oct. 30: US Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher met in Morocco with King Hasan on possible arms sales and said the 2 countries had "a large measure of agreement" on the need to achieve a "peaceful solution" to the problem of Western Sahara. [NYT]
- Nov. 3: Liberian President William Tolbert arrived in Rabat on a visit. [FBIS]
- Moroccan armed forces numbering 7000 began a major offensive against the Polisario guerrillas in the Western Sahara. [AN]
- Nov. 14: Boucetta arrived in London for talks with British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington on the Western Sahara dispute. [AN]

Oman

(See also, Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates)

1979

- Sept. 17: UAA Vice President and Premier Shaykh Rāshid bin Sa'īd Āl Maktūm met with Sultan Qābūs bin Sa'īd in Salalah. [FBIS]

- Sept. 18: A Foreign Ministry spokesman said that the UAA and Oman had reached an agreement on the border dispute between the 2 countries. [FBIS]
- Sept. 26: Egyptian Vice President Ḥusnī Mubārak met with Sultan Qābūs in Oman. [FBIS]
- Sept. 28: *Middle East Economic Digest* reported that an Omani plan for the defense of the Strait of Hormuz had been rejected by Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait and South Yemen. [MEED]
- Oct. 9: Omani Deputy Premier for Security and Defense Affairs Fahd bin Taymūr returned to Muscat at the end of a 5 day visit to Egypt. [FBIS]
- Oct. 20: Bahraini Foreign Minister Shaykh Muḥammad bin Mubārak Āl Khalifah met with Sultan Qābūs in Muscat. [FBIS]
- Oct. 26: The Foreign Ministry said Portugal and Oman had decided to establish diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level. [FBIS]

Pakistan

(See also, Saudi Arabia)

1979

- Sept. 1: President Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq left Karachi to attend the Nonaligned Summit Conference in Havana, Cuba. [FBIS]
- Sept. 2: *The New York Times* reported that Benazir Bhutto, daughter of executed former Premier Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had been charged with 3 political offenses under martial law regulations. [NYT]
- Sept. 22: President Zia-ul-Haq said that Pakistan was "not in a position" to make a nuclear bomb and "had no intention" of making one. [NYT]
- Mawlānā 'Abdallāh Mawdūdī, Islamic scholar and co-founder of the Jām'at al-Islāmī Party died in Buffalo, New York, of a heart attack, aged 76. [NYT]
- Oct. 2: The Electoral Commission ruled that the Pakistan People's Party and the Pakistan National Alliance had failed to fulfill rules governing political parties. It said that only 16 of the more than 100 political parties that had applied for registration would be permitted to participate in upcoming elections. [NYT]
- Oct. 4: The Pakistan People's Party accused Zia-ul-Haq of "rigging and fraud" aimed at keeping the party out of the elections. [NYT]
- Oct. 16: Zia-ul-Haq announced the postponement of elections, banned all political parties and meetings, closed some periodicals and imposed censorship on the rest. [NYT]
- Oct. 17: The government placed Nusrat Bhutto, wife of former Premier Bhutto, and their daughter Benazir under house arrest. Other opponents of the régime were also detained. [NYT]
- Foreign Affairs Advisor Agha Shahi met with US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in Washington on Pakistan's nuclear program. [NYT]

- Nov. 5: A Pakistani who tried to hijack a jetliner in 1978 was executed in Rawalpindi. [NYT]
- Nov. 11: The Lahore High Court admitted a petition challenging the ban on political parties, the second amendment to the Constitution and postponement of the general elections. [FBIS]
- Nov. 12: Zia-ul-Haq announced that, despite reports to the contrary, there would be no change in the federal Cabinet or the present administrative set-up. [FBIS]
- Nov. 13: A correspondent for Hong Kong's *Far Eastern Economic Review* was arrested at his residence. [FBIS]
- Nov. 15: Zia-ul-Haq inaugurated the Jelabandi bridge, a landmark in Kashmir reconstruction. [FBIS]

Qatar

(See also, Saudi Arabia)

1979

- Sept. 9: Amir Shaykh Khalifah bin Hamad Āl Thānī flew to Europe on a private visit. [FBIS]
- Sept. 11: Maltese Premier Dom Mintoff arrived in Doha for talks with Qatari officials. [FBIS]
- Oct. 4: Saudi Arabian Defense Minister Sulṭān bin 'Abd al-'Azīz met with Amir Shaykh Khalifah in Paris. [FBIS]
- Oct. 14: Amir Shaykh Khalifah returned to Doha at the end of a private visit to Europe. [FBIS]
- Nov. 8: The Mauritanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmedou Ould 'Abdallah arrived in Qatar for talks with the Amir and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. [FBIS]

Saudi Arabia

(See also, Petroleum Affairs, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Qatar, Syria, Yemen)

1979

- Aug. 19: Pakistani President Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq arrived in Jiddah on a 3 day visit to Saudi Arabia. [FBIS]
- Aug. 29: Sudanese President Ja'far al-Numayrī arrived in al-Ṭā'if and was met by King Khālid. [FBIS]
- Sept. 1: King Khālid arrived in Geneva on a visit to Switzerland. [FBIS]
- Sept. 2: Lebanese Defense Minister Jūzif Skāf met with Crown Prince Fahd in al-Ṭā'if on the question of Saudi aid to Lebanon. [AN]
- Sept. 6: UAA President Shaykh Zāyid bin Sulṭān Āl Nuḥayyān met with King Khālid in Geneva. [FBIS]
- Sept. 8: Iranian Minister of National Guidance Nāṣir Mināchī met in al-Ṭā'if with Crown Prince Fahd. [NYT]

- Sept. 9: Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi arrived in al-Ṭā'if and was met by Crown Prince Fahd. [FBIS]
- Sept. 10: Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre met with Crown Prince Fahd in al-Ṭā'if. [FBIS]
- Sept. 20: Jordanian King Ḥusayn arrived in Geneva and met with King Khālid. [FBIS]
- Oct. 6: Lebanese Premier Salim al-Ḥuṣṣ arrived in Jiddah for talks with Saudi leaders. [FBIS]
- Oct. 16: A meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAA, Oman and Saudi Arabia took place in al-Ṭā'if on Gulf matters. [FBIS]
- Oct. 19: A group of Chinese Muslims left Peking for Saudi Arabia to make the pilgrimage to Mecca. [NYT]
- Nov. 10: Finnish Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen arrived in Jiddah for a 3 day official visit. [AN]

South Yemen

(See also, General, Algeria, Libya, Yemen)

1979

- Aug. 16: Maḥmūd Sa'īd al-Madhī was appointed Finance Minister. [FBIS]
- Sept. 17: Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin ended a visit to South Yemen. [NYT]
- Oct. 4: Premier 'Alī Nāṣir Muḥammad returned to Aden at the end of a visit to Yemen. [FBIS]
- Oct. 24: Chairman of the Presidium 'Abd al-Fattāḥ Ismā'īl arrived in Moscow and was met by Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev. [FBIS]
- Oct. 25: South Yemen and the Soviet Union signed a 20-year treaty of friendship in Moscow. [NYT]
- Nov. 4: The first session of talks on economic and technical coöperation between 'Uthmān 'Abd al-Jabbār, acting Deputy Minister for Planning, and the Deputy Minister for External Trade of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) began in Aden. [FBIS]
- Nov. 13: Premier Muḥammad appointed Ṣāliḥ Abū Bakr ibn Ḥusaynun and Aḥmad Salim 'Ubayd Deputy Defense Ministers. [FBIS]
- Nov. 15: Erich Honecker, Chairman of the GDR State Council, arrived in Aden on an official visit. [FBIS]

Sudan

(See also, Saudi Arabia)

1979

- August 17: A new Cabinet was formed:
 Aḥmad al-Sayyid Ḥamad: *Communications*
 Hasan 'Abdallāh al-Turābī: *Attorney General*
 'Abd al-Mājid Khalīl: *First Vice President and Defense*

al-Bukhārī Sālim Hawdah: *Communications and Marine Transport*

ʿAbd al-Ḥafīz Zlitnī: *Education*

Muḥammad al-Duwayk: *Municipalities* [MEED]

Feb. 4: Demonstrators attacked the French Embassy in Tripoli, causing extensive damage. The French Ambassador said he felt there was a "close link" between the attack and recent "problems in Tunisia." [NYT]

Feb. 5: France recalled its Ambassador and diplomatic staff from Libya and ordered a similar number of Libyan diplomats to leave France to protest the attack on the French Embassy in Tripoli. [NYT]

Feb. 6: Venezuelan President Luis Herrera Campins arrived in Benghazi and met with Qadhafī. [FBIS]

Morocco

(See also, Arab Israeli Conflict, General, Iraq, Saudi Arabia)

1979

Dec. 5: The Organization of African Unity ended a meeting in Monrovia, Liberia, and called on Morocco to withdraw its troops from Western Sahara. It recommended that a peacekeeping force be set up to monitor a cease fire in the disputed territory. [NYT]

1980

Jan. 25: *Arab News* reported that the US had announced it would sell 50 military aircraft to Morocco. [AN]

Feb. 12: King Hasan arrived in Marrakesh at the end of a visit to Saudi Arabia and Iraq. [FBIS]

Oman

(See also, General, Petroleum Affairs)

1979

Dec. 14: ʿĀṣim al-Jamālī was named Minister of Public Works. [FBIS]

1980

Jan. 3: Egyptian Vice President Ḥusnī Mubārak arrived in Muscat and met with Sultan Qābūs bin Saʿīd. [FBIS]

Jan. 10: British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington arrived in Muscat on a 3 day visit for talks with Omani officials. [FBIS]

Jan. 14: Jordanian King Ḥusayn arrived in Oman and was met by Sultan Qābūs. [FBIS]

Jan. 19: Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Qays al-Munʿim al-Zawāwī denied reports that Oman would offer military bases on its territory to the US. [FBIS]

Feb. 7: Tunisian Foreign Minister Mohamed Fitouri arrived in Muscat for talks. [FBIS]

Pakistan

(See also, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates)

1979

Nov. 21: Hundreds of demonstrators stormed and set fire to the US Embassy in Islamabad, killing 1 US Marine. Pakistani troops rescued about 100 people trapped in the Embassy chancery. [NYT]

Demonstrators set fire to the US cultural centers in Rawalpindi and Lahore. A British cultural center in Rawalpindi was burned. [NYT]

The *Associated Press* cited a leader of the attackers as saying he had believed US citizens had been responsible for the attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca. [NYT]

Nov. 22: The bodies of a second American and 2 Pakistanis were found at the Embassy. [NYT]

The *New York Times* reported that 2 of the demonstrators had also died in the attack. [NYT]

Iranian Āyat Allāh Rūḥ Allāh Khumaynī called the attack on the US Embassy in Islamabad "a great joy for us." [NYT]

Nov. 24: Secretary of Information Mujib ur-Rahman deplored the attack on the US Embassy as "un-Islamic" and said that President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq had ordered the Embassy rebuilt "at the maximum speed." [NYT]

Nov. 28: The government announced that it had amended the penal code to permit imprisonment of journalists who published "defamatory material." [NYT]

Nov. 29: A Pakistani correspondent of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* was sentenced to 1 year of hard labor for writing an article concerning unrest in Baluchistan. [NYT]

Dec. 2: Students demanding compensation for the family of a student killed in the US Embassy in Islamabad the month before clashed with the police in Rawalpindi. [NYT]

Dec. 11: A member of the Hyderabad City Council was arrested for leading a demonstration of support for executed former Premier Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. [NYT]

Dec. 16: Djibouti President Hasan Gouled arrived in Islamabad on a 5 day visit to Pakistan. [FBIS]

Dec. 26: President Zia-ul-Haq returned to Islamabad at the end of a 2 day visit to Saudi Arabia. [FBIS]

Dec. 28: Foreign Affairs Adviser Agha Shahi returned to Islamabad after a 2 day visit to Iran. [FBIS]

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